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Abstract:
Properly speaking, international criminal responsibility is not a new
chapter of public international law, but rather the recent revival of an old
chapter of the Law of Nations. In the recent past, we have seen the
emergence of ad hoc international criminal tribunals that is with a limited
competence, as established in their statutes.(1) Instead, today’s International
Criminal Court enjoys, within its statutory (treaty) limits, a general
jurisdiction; it is thus a permanent organ of a general character, mirroring
the ICJ in matters of international criminal law. It will also be in charge of the
international criminal responsibility of the individuals.
In contrast with the two previous approaches, based on ‘right’, we will
deal here with ‘obligations’ that are bestowed upon the individual, that is,
international obligations not to commit some acts characterized as crimina
iuris gentium. PIL deals with the individual by prohibiting the perpetration of
such crimes. The individual is therefore construed as the passive subject
within international legal relations; he must account – before municipal and
international courts alike – for his misdeeds (violation of international
obligations) committed against States as well as other individuals. (2) Thus, if,
(1) For instance, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
(2) It ought to be noted that individual’s international criminal responsibility is not in
fact incurred vis-à-vis those persons who have actually suffered (or were affected) by
the perpetration of his crime. Here we find again, yet with inverted roles, the same
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from the angle of international human rights protection, responsibility
involved an active personality, in this case the personality is deemed to be
passive.
Aside from international “crimes” of the States whose existence remains
to be carefully considered,(3) international law contemplates the existence of
certain categories of crimes committed by individuals acting either
individually, or as State organs. Still, only a few of these violations are
susceptible to be prosecuted and punished on the international plane while
others are only prosecuted and punished by national jurisdictions.
The revolutionary developments which have punctuated this province of
PIL from the second half of the Twentieth century onwards, severely
stepping into one of the core elements of the State reserved domain (of
criminal repression), show that the individual must also be considered as an
international subject in this domain, as long as he is directly prosecuted and
tried by an international judiciary mechanism.
It is indeed on the plane of international punishment of these crimes that
the individual arose in international law as a bearer of international
obligations, and as such as a subject of international law. (4) Finally, it is
important to note that an individual’s criminal responsibility does not affect,
in any way, the eventual concomitant international responsibility of the
State, on the contrary this “duality of responsibility continues to be a
constant feature of international law”.(5) Indeed, if its conduct can be

equation in the previous two perspectives, i.e. State or the International Community
(injured party) and individual (defaulting party).
(3) See: G. Distefano, Fundamentals of Public International Law. A Sketch of the
International Legal Order, Leiden, 2019, pp. 700-702.
(4) See: G. Balladore Pallieri, 1962, Diritto internazionale pubblico, pp. 221-222; S.
Romano, Corso di diritto internazionale 1933, pp. 76-77; R. Quadri, 1968, pp. 407-408
(since the condition this famous jurist set forward – i.e. the existence of international
organs endowed with the power to repress on the international plane these
international crimes – has henceforth been fulfilled); A. Cassese,
International Law, 2001, pp. 79-81; A. Verdross, B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht,
1984, §§ 430-443 (pp. 260-267);
(5) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 2007, § 173 (at 116). See Article 25 § 4 of the ICC Statute as well as Article
58 IR 2001, which recites: ““These articles are without prejudice to any question of the
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attributed to a State in one way or another,(6) then the State’s international
responsibility can be engaged. Henceforth, there will be two international
responsibility (the individual’s and the State’s) within the international legal
order which could give rise to different types of repression and forms of
sanctions.(7)
Keywords: international criminal responsibility, international criminal
law, war crimes, crimes against humanity, crime of aggression, crime of
genocide, International Criminal Court, ad hoc international criminal
tribunals.
I. The International Criminalization of Individuals’ Conducts: A Very
Short Story
I.1. The Forerunners
Keeping always in mind that any periodization – and all the more a
succinct one – is inevitably arbitrary, one may start from 1268 when the
grandson of the Holy Roman Emperor and King of Sicily Frederick II,
Conradin of Hohenstaufen – the last heir of his dynasty – was beheaded in
Naples after having tried to enforce his legitimate rights over the Kingdom.
In the wake of his defeat at Tagliacozzo, he was swiftly tried (in fact a sham
trial) for having waged an “unjust war” (hence an alleged breach of “ius ad
bellum” set of rules)(8) against Charles of Anjou, at that time papalappointed king, and was accordingly executed. In 1474, P. von Haggenbach,
following the rebellion of the imperial town of Breisach (Alsace, France), was
arrested, tried (presumably, again, an unfair trial orchestrated by the
imperial cities of Strasburg, Basel, Colmar and Selestat) and beheaded for
having infringed the authority of the Emperor. Even earlier, and more
generally, the Law of Nations provided for universal jurisdiction of
individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a
State.”
(6) See: G: Distefano, 2019, pp. 653-695.
(7) “The State, and those acting on its behalf, bear criminal responsibility for such
violations of international law as by reason of their gravity, their ruthlessness, and
their contempt for human life place them within the category of criminal acts as
generally understood in the law of civilized countries”, Oppenheim’s International Law,
8th ed. (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht), p. 355.
(8) See: G. Distefano, “Use of Force”, Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed
Conflict, ed. by A. Clapham & P. Gaeta, Oxford, 2014, pp. 545-573
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prosecution and trial against pirates, admittedly qualified as “hostis humani
generis”,(9) i.e. enemies to the whole mankind. The scenario of piracy
illustrates vividly one of the distinctive features of (future) international
crimes to the extent that the jurisdictional criterion, allowing prosecution
and trial by all States whosoever, is disconnected from all nexus, be it
territorial or personal. As it has been observed, piracy is an “assault upon
vessels navigated on the high seas, committed animo furandi i.e. with the
intention to steal, whether the robbery of forcible depredation be effected
or not, and whether or it be accompanied by murder or personal injury”.(10)
The very concept of an international crime underlies the act of piracy in the
high seas since, as an authority rightly emphasized, the juridical
consequence of piracy is the “denationalization”(11) of the pirate vessel, i.e. it
falls within the jurisdiction of any State.
Jurisprudence at large acknowledges that these are the forerunners of
international criminal trials (“delicta iuris gentium”); in effect, one has to
stress that in both cases, as in others which will follow, the tribunals were
not at all international but municipal, a national authority standing behind
them a bestowing to them the required legality. This can be explained since
a rudimentary monism between international and municipal orders exist at
that time and persisted for some time until at least the beginning of the
XVIII Century.
In effect, the true forerunners of international criminal law and hence of
a genuine international punishment date back to the end of WWI, as we will
see in the following chapter. However, even before this timeline, doctrine
(9) Quite revealing, yet in another context, Emer de Vattel attached this formula to
those individuals who, during a war, “wantonly deprive mankind of these
monuments of art and models of taste”, The Law of Nations, 1758 (translated from
French), Book III, IX, § 168.
(10) Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law, 1879, Vol. I (Part II),
Chapter XX, p. 488; likewise: P. Fiore, IL diritto internazionale codificato, 1909, Articles
298-300 (p. 192); Th. J. Lawrence, The Principles of International Law,1911, para. 102
(pp. 232-237). Modern definition has not changed substantially; see Article 101
UNCLOS III. This law-making convention provides accordingly for universal jurisdiction
in the repression of piracy (Article 100).
(11) F. von Liszt, Le droit international. Exposé systématique, 1928 (translated from
German), 1928, para. 26 (p. 221). In the same vein: L. Oppenheim, International Law, A
Treatise, 1912, Vol. 1, para. 278 (pp. 345-346).

38

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2021/iss85/10

] [Year 35, Issue No. 85 January 2021]

4

Distefano: ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????: ???? ????? ???????? ???????

[Prof. Giovanni Distefano]

paved the way to the normative development; it suffices to peruse any of
the most authoritative handbooks of PIL to notice that international criminal
(or, synonymously, penal) law features a chapter, let alone a in-depth study
on this matter.(12) State practice did not lagged, either, and it is especially
the Laws of War(13) which is furthered thus contributing to the enhancement
of this branch of PIL. At the normative level – both municipal and, especially,
international – one may mention the Lieber Code (1863)(14), the 1st Geneva
Convention (1864)(15), the 1906 Geneva Convention on Wounded and Sick
Combatants, the The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907) related to the
conduct of hostilities, as well as the 1925 Geneva Protocol(16), to name only
a few of them.(17) They all, yet at different degrees, contain embryonic
elements of international criminal law purporting to punish the individuals
having breached the obligations contained therein. As the International
Tribunal in Nurnberg stated in an authoritative way:
“That International Law imposes duties and liabilities upon
individuals as well as upon States has long been recognized … Many
other authorities could be cited, but enough has been said to show
that individuals can be punished for violations of International Law.
Crimes against International Law are committed by men, not by
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such
crimes can the provisions of International Law be enforced”(18)
(12) Gustave Moynier, one of the co-founders of the Red Cross Movement, threw out
the idea, following the conclusion of 1864 Geneva Convention, to establish a
permanent international criminal court.
(13) See: G. Distefano, 2014, pp. 545-547.
(14) “Instructions for the government of armies of the United States in the field”
issued by US President Lincoln (General Orders n°100) in order to regulate the use of
force by US troops (unionists) during the Civil War against the Confederates (thus a
non-international armed conflict). Several of its provisions set forth the necessary legal
basis allowing municipal jurisdictions to prosecute and punish offences flowing from
the breaches of the duties contained therein.
(15) “Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in
the Field”.
(16) “Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare”.
(17) One may also mention in this context the various international agreements
prohibiting the white slave trade and slavery at large.
(18) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, pp. 446, 447.
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I.2. Contemporary
In a way, the two World Wars have, as it happened in other fields of PIL,
ignited a process which is still on-going nowadays. Article 227 of the
Versailles Treaty provided for the incrimination of Guillaume II while at the
same time sketching the substantive criminal law required to assess his
conduct. Indeed, Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty considered the German
Reich Emperor, Guillaume II of Hohenzollern, as guilty of “a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties”. In the same vein,
article 228(19) of the same treaty set the obligation for Germany to bring
before its own jurisdictions(20) any individual allegedly guilty of war crimes,
flowing from the breach of the so-called “laws and customs of war”.(21)
Besides, in 1937, alongside with the Convention on the “Prevention and
Punishment of Terrorism”(22) the League of Nations (hereafter: LoN) adopted
(19) Paragraph 3 of this provision derogated to the ne bis in idem principle of criminal
law to the extent that it set out that it was to “apply notwithstanding any proceedings
or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies”.
(20) In fact, no tribunal was established by Germany pursuant to this obligation; only
12 German militaries, among 45 selected by the Allies, were eventually tried at Leipzig
of which six were acquitted whilst the others were sentenced to (only) 4 years of
detention.
(21) In 1915, a joint Declaration (GB-F-Russia) contained the formula “crimes against
humanity”: “In the presence of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and
civilization, the allied Governments publicly inform the Sublime Porte that they will
hold personally for the said crimes all members of the Ottoman Government as well as
those of its agents who are found to be involved in such massacres” (quoted in: R.
Sarkissian, “The Armenian Genocide: A contextual view of the crime and politics of
denial”, in The Criminal Law of Genocide. International, Comparative and Contextual
Aspects, Ashgate, 2009, p. 3; italics added). The three Allied Governments referred at
the violent and systematic persecution of the Armenian and other Christian
populations of the Ottoman Empire by the latter government. According to its Art.
230, “The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the
persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for the
massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory which
formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914”. However, since the Treaty of
Sèvres – which never entered into force – was eventually superseded by the Treaty of
Lausanne (14 July 1923) – which contains no charge of responsibility upon Ottoman
officials – no punishment ever really took place.
(22) It ought to be observed incidentally that this Convention contains the first
international general definition of terrorism through a multilateral convention (Article
2).
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the “Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court”, whose
Article 1 established in fact such a Court. None of them entered into force,
failing the required number (3!) of ratifications or accessions.
Later on, in the wake of WWII, two international military tribunals
(Nuremberg and Tokyo) were instated in order to repress the great Nazis
and Japanese war criminals.(23) In this regard one has however to make clear
that while the IMT of Nuremberg(24) was genuinely an international
jurisdiction since it was established through an international agreement
concluded between the 4 Allies in Europe (USA, USSR, UK and France),(25) the
second one, Tokyo, was set up by an unilateral act of the occupying power,
USA, by virtue of its powers according to the “laws and customs of war”.
As it will be shown further in the text, all these developments(26) have led
to a dramatic strengthening and deepening of international criminal law
both in its substantive and in its institutional dimension. As regards the first
one, a whole new body of international norms have enabled the
criminalization of some acts, such as the crime of genocide,(27) war crimes,(28)

(23) It must be noted in this regard that the first international attempts to punish
individual crimes have been carried on by the victors after a major conflict. This
reminds us that Ancient Greece philosophical thought distinguished between three
forms of justice: a) Nemesis (i.e. vengeance); b) Dike (ideal form of justice, may be
embodied by the ICC); c) Themis (the balance between conflicting yet equally relevant
interests, pursued by the two ad hoc international tribunals set up by the SC).
(24) London Agreement of 8th August 1945 (i.e. the Constitution of the IMT).
Alongside with this international jurisdiction, military tribunals were set up by each
occupying power – in its own specific area of occupation – that were endowed, again
according to PIL, to prosecute and trial Germany criminals; the latter were also tried by
German tribunals.
(25) It was created “for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war
criminals of the European Axis” (Article 1).
(26) It has been wisely observed that contemporary international criminal law fits
appropriately in the “Law of cooperation approach”: G. Abi-Saab, Cours général de
droit international public,
1987, p. 435.
(27) Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), (2007), §§ 143-201 (at
103 – 127).
(28) Cf. i.a. : ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgement of 16 November 1998, §§ 301307.
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crimes against humanity (and torture)(29) and crime of aggression. These
“new” international crimes have thus accrued to other criminal acts which
existed before and which were mainly if not exclusively tried by national
jurisdictions(30) – even though they are territorially disconnected(31) –
namely: a) piracy in the high seas;(32) b) slavery and slave trade,(33) including
the historical case of the “white slave trade”;(34) c) trafficking of narcotic d)
obscene and pornographic publications. In each of these last crimes cases,
the author of the crime (an individual or a group thereof) is the final
beneficiary of these international obligations, but the institutional
mechanisms of repression being merely national, he cannot be considered
as being the true holder on the international plane. In fact, these crimes are
bestowed the adjective “international” insofar as their repression is
extended beyond the traditional jurisdictional nexus (territory and
nationality of the author/victim); in fact, what happens is the extension of
States’ jurisdictions thanks to the principle of universal jurisdiction. Hence,
under these conditions, the mere incrimination under the international legal
order of these violations does not at all suffice in view of recognizing
individuals an international legal personality.
To sum up, it does not go unnoticed that Nuremberg Trial in penetrating
into the State veil had two effects with regard to the status of individuals in
PIL: a) on one side it made the individual, as a State organ, personally
responsible for perpetrating an international crime; b) on the other side, a
(29) Cf. i.a. : ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgement of 10 December 1998,
paras. 142, 158-164. It ought to be underscored from the outset that “torture” is
admittedly a “discrete crime”, that is to say is a crime by itself without thus requiring a
nexus either with an armed conflict (torture as a war crime) or with a “widespread or
systematic attack” (torture as a CAH). Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al.,
2001, paras. 466-483.
(30) See: Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals, 1953, pp. 208-217.
(31) See: A. W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (pp. 201-202).
(32) P. Fiore, Articles 295-300 (pp. 191-193); H. S. Maine, International Law,1888, p.
76; Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Vol. 1, § 299 (pp. 746-747); J. C. Bluntschli,
Le droit international codifié, (translated from German), 1870, Article 343 (p. 194);
A.W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (p. 202); W.E. Hall, International Law, 1924, p. 317.
(33) J. C. Bluntschli, 1870, Article 363 (p. 204); J. Westlake, International Law, 1904,
Vol. I, p. 253; A.W. Heffter, 1866, § 104 (p. 202).
(34) F. Despagnet, Cours de droit international public, 1905, §§ 262-263 (pp. 281-283);
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State has become internationally responsible for violating (nascent) HR visà-vis its own nationals, hence making them true subjects of PIL.(35)
There are some principles – both of procedural and substantive nature –
which underlie international criminal law and thus the engagement of an
individual responsibility thereof. (36) Most, if not all, of them derive from
municipal law and in this respect their original source may thus be found in
Article 38 (1) c) ICJ Statute, i.e. the so-called “general principles of Law”.(37)
II. Substantive General Principles of International Criminal Law
II.1.1. General Remarks
By substantive International Criminal Law is admittedly meant the body
of rules, some of which plunging their roots quite far in the past, by which
not only patterns of behaviours are prohibited, but their infringements are
hereby qualified as crimes, thus leading to a universal punishment.
Traditionally, one of the most ancient and striking examples of
“international crime” is that of “piracy in High Seas”(38); in accordance with
the Latin maxim, they were considered “enemy of Mankind” (“hostis
humanis generis”), as they put themselves (or tried to) outside and against
the Law, i.e. thus “Outlaws”. This qualification allowed any State to
prosecute and punish those who committed such acts; in a nutshell, so went
(35) “International law has in the past made some claim that there is a limit to the
omnipotence of the state and that the individual human being, the ultimate unit of all
law, is not disentitled to the protection of mankind when the state tramples upon his
rights in a manner which outrages the conscience of mankind”, British Prosecutor, Trial
of the Major War Criminals, vol. 19, 471-472.
(36) “This term international criminal law has at least six different meanings. It may
be identified with the territorial scope of municipal criminal law. It may be equated
with internationally authorised municipal criminal law. It may mean municipal criminal
law common to civilised nations. It may signify international co-operation in the
administration of municipal criminal law and, finally, stand for international criminal
law in the material sense of the term”, G. Schwartzenberger, International Law, 3rd.
ed., 1957, p. 255.
(37) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 559-579.
(38) According to Art. 11 of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention, any State can
punish those who commit such acts (the definition of which is given in that same
provision).
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the application of the universal jurisdiction,(39) according to which the usual
requirements of criminal law (personal and territorial links) were discarded
for the purpose of justice.(40) In short, when a State put a pirate on trial, it
somehow acted as an organ of the International Community as a whole.
Since then, substantive International Criminal Law has steadfastly
developed, especially since the end of XIX Century.
Restraining ourselves to the development occurred since the beginning of
the last century, one has to stress that they took place within the province
of the Law of War (including both branches of ius ad bellum and ius in bello),
notably the outlawing of War (1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact) as well as through
the furtherance of the “laws and customs of war”, notably the two 1929
Geneva Conventions (prisoners and wounded and sick).(41)
IMT in Nuremberg and, on lesser extent, US-established Tokyo Military
Tribunal have later on dramatically contributed to the enhancement and
clarification of substantive international criminal law, especially through the
definition of international crimes, their elements and excuses, etc. With
regard to international delinquencies, Article 6 of the IMT Statute
enumerated the three categories of crimes being prosecuted by this
jurisdiction; alongside with a) crime against peace and b) war crimes,
emerges, from the “legal conscience of civilised nations” – one would be
tempted to say - , “crime against humanity” (lit. c). The latter will generate
afterwards the crime of genocide, a new crime which will emancipate itself
as a specific crime from the general category of “crimes against humanity”,
thanks to the 1948 UN Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. In this context, it is noteworthy to stress that in the light
of the IMT Statute it is apparent that the crime against peace is not only the
(39) This idea had been around for centuries, at least since Grotius who so wrote in the
middle of Seventeenth century: “We must also know, that Kings, and those who are
invested with a Power equal to that of Kings, have a Right to exact Punishments, not
only for Injuries committed against themselves, or their Subjects, but likewise, for
those which do not peculiarly concern them, but which are, in any Persons
whatsoever, grievous Violations of the Law of Nature or Nations”, Book II, Chapter XX,
para. 40.1.
(40) See: R. Higgins, International Law and the Avoidance, Containment and Resolution
of Disputes: General course on Public International Law, 1991, at 93-95.
(41) One might also mention in this connection, the 1927 IDI’s resolution aimed at the
unification of international penal law.
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supreme crime(42) but also that its overarching character means that the
perpetration of the other two (i.e. ear crimes and crime against humanity)
depends on its existence. In sum, a nexus must be established between the
existence of an unlawful war (hence a crime against peace or crime of
aggression) and either a war crime or a crime against peace; therefore,
these two crimes were subordinated to the crime against peace so that,
according to IMT Statute and jurisprudence, they couldn’t exist without and
outside it.(43) We will see later on that the requirement of a nexus will
disappear and that nowadays, as illustrated by the ICC Statute, the
hierarchy, if any, between international crimes has been substantially
upended (infra II).(44)
Among other relevant contributions to substantive international criminal
law, one may also recall the rule according to which “the official positions of
the defendant shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or
mitigating punishment” (Article 7). Thus, for the first time ever, bar Emperor
William II unlucky precedent, by this principle a profound wedge was
inserted in States’ immunities for acts accomplished by organs in their
official capacity. In a germane key, another rule provided for the discarding
of “superior order” as a circumstances precluding responsibility since Article
8 sets that “the fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his
Government or of a superior shall not free him from responsibility, but may
be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that
justice so requires”.

(42) “In the opinion of the Tribunal, those who wage aggressive war are doing that
which is equally illegal, and of much greater moment than a breach of one of the rules
of the Hague Convention”, IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. 445.
(43) “To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is
the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it
contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole”, IMT Judgment of 1st October
1946, p. 421.
(44) Indeed, ICTR affirmed: “The ICTR Statute does not establish a hierarchy of norms,
but rather all three offences are presented on an equal footing. While genocide may
be considered the gravest crime in respect to war crimes and crime against
humanity”, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 470. True, in this case,
the tribunal did have no jurisdiction over crime of aggression – the conflict in Rwanda
having a non-international character – but the listing of international crimes in the ICC
Statute may nevertheless hint to that hierarchy, if any.
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Furthermore, the development and fortification of international criminal
law took place thanks to the jurisprudence of the IMT which remained
nearly until the end of last century the reference for PIL and still represents
today a landmark achievement. Its lasting contribution appeared so
conspicuous that already in 1946, UNGA adopted its 95/1 resolution
whereby it “affirms {that}the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and the judgement of the Tribunal”. (45)
Moreover, UNGA mandated ILC to study the “desirability and possibility” of
the establishment of a (permanent) international criminal court as well as to
clarify substantive international criminal law. After adopting in 1950 a Text
whereby it stated the “Principles of International Law recognized in the
Charter of the Nurnberg Tribunal and in the Judgement of the Tribunal”, (46)
the ILC decided, alas, to adjourn its mandate pending the definition of the
crime of aggression (i.e. crime against peace). It will be in 1981 only that
UNGA invited again ILC to resume its work (in abeyance since then).(47)
Eventually, in 1996 ILC adopted the “Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind”(48) which constituted at that time the most exhaustive
attempt to reunite under a single text a comprehensive tableau of
international crimes as well as their definition. The same year UNGA
adopted a resolution deciding to hold a diplomatic conference aiming at
establishing an international criminal court.(49) ILC “draft code” formed
hence the basis of negotiation in Rome of the future Statute of ICC which
was eventually adopted the 17th July 1998. According to its Article 126(50) the
Statute entered into force the 1st July 2002 and today 123 States are Parties
to it. Rome Statute is today the most recent international conventional
instrument in matters of substantive international criminal law; hence, we
(45) Paragraph 1 of the resolution adopted on the 11th December 1946 (“Affirmation
of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nurnberg
Tribunal”). See also: : M. Whiteman, Digest of International Law, Vol. 1, pp. 201-205.
(46) ILC Report to the UNGA, A/5/12, 1950, paras. 13-14.
(47) UNGA Resolution 36/106 (10 December 1981).
(48) A/51/10, 1996, Chapter II, paras. 30-50.
(49) UNGA Resolution 51/207 (17 December 1996); however, one has to wait another
year for the UNGA to implement its previous resolution (Resolution 52/160 of 15
December 1997).
(50) This provision required 60 States’ instruments of ratification and/or accession to
be deposited for the Statute to enter into force and hence for the establishment of the
ICC.
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will refer to it in order to unearth this body of law, keeping nonetheless in
mind that customary international law may supplement, integrate and even
modify it.(51)
II.1.2. The Principle of Legality
Also known under the Latin maxim “Nullum crimen sine lege praevia”
(NCSL), this principle embodies a fundamental requirement of justice: an
individual act can be criminalized only if at the time it was committed there
was (already) a rule bestowing this qualification. In the seminal IMT
judgement France and al. v. Goering and al. (1946), the Tribunal affirmed:
“It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental
principle of all law -international and domestic- is that there can be
no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law: “Nullum crimen
sine lege; Nulla poena sine lege”.(52) It was submitted that ex post
facto punishment is abhorent to the law of all civilised nations, that
no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the
alleged criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined
aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed for its commission,
and no court had been created to try and punish offenders” (53)
This principle has henceforth been codified in several international
instruments establishing international criminal jurisdictions(54) and largely
reflects international(55) and domestic(56) jurisprudence.
(51) On the relations between the two principal sources of PIL, see G. Distefano, 2019,
pp. 369-391.
(52) This second principle is the corollary of the first one since punishment of an
individual presupposes his act to be qualified beforehand as “criminal” (hence “Nullum
crime sine lege”). ICC Statute aptly distinguishes the two principles (infra note 54).
(53) IMT, judgment of 1 October 1946, in The Trial of German Major War Criminals.
Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg, Germany, Part
22 (22nd August, 1946 to 1st October, 1946), p. 444.
(54) Article 7 (3) ICTY, Articles 22 & 23 ICC, as well as HR instruments: Article 12 (2)
ICCPR 1966, Article 7 (1) ECHR. It is not too bold to affirm that it constitutes nowadays
a peremptory norm of PIL, thus its absence in some of international criminal courts’
statute (e.g. ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone, etc.) does not at all imply that it is not
applicable, far from that.
(55) ICTY, the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, § 135; ECHR, Streletz and Kessler v. Ad,
22/03/2001, §§ 87-88; ICTY, the Prosecutor v. Vasilievic, 2002, §§ 193, 196, 200-202.
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II.1.3. Crime of aggression (or formerly known as “Crime
against peace)
From the commencement, one has to underline that this crime (formerly
known as “Crime against Peace”) differs at least from the other three
international crimes to the extent that it is the only one that requires an
official capacity (as an organ of a State) for an individual to be pinned down
as a criminal. In sum, this crime entails, at the same time, the responsibility
of the State whose organ has planned or decided a war of aggression.
The criminalization of this conduct logically depended from the outlawing
of war, i.e. offensive use of force; hence, as long as war was not banned
from the realm of PIL, it was not conceivable to construe such an
international crime. In fact, Article 227 of Versailles Treaty did not provide
for the trial of William II for having, strictly speaking, waged a war of
aggression, but for having disrespected conventional obligations
guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg. One has to wait
1928 Briand-Kellogg Pact for war of aggression to be outlawed.(57) Though,
this international agreement does not necessarily convey the necessary
criminalization since it restricts itself to ban war, thus creating rights and
obligations incumbent upon States parties to it and not their organs for
having waged it. IMT Statute and jurisprudence will be instrumental in
bridging the gap between the “mere” unlawfulness of war and the necessary
criminalization of State organs for having decided and planned it.(58) Indeed,
referring precisely to the 1928 Pact of Paris, the Tribunal stated, in order to
satisfy the requirement set by the principle of legality, that:
“In its opinion, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of
national policy necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is
(56) Supreme Court of Canada, Finta case, 1994
(57) More on this treaty, G. Distefano, “La longue marche vers l’abrogation du droit
d’auto-protection armée : happy end ou remake en vue ? », in Unité et diversité du
droit international. Ecrits en l’honneur du Professeur Pierre-Marie Dupuy, sous la
direction de D. Alland et al., Paris, 2014, pp. 299-320 ;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1dYL0mqMoqI&t=2609s.
(58) The indictment as regards the crime against peace concerned the invasion of
Austria (1938), Czechoslovakia and Poland (1939), Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg,
Denmark and Norway (1940), Yugoslavia, Greece and USSR (1941),
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illegal in International Law; and that those who plan and wage such a
war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a
crime in so doing”(59)
The completion of the crime against peace goes through the adoption by
the UNGA in 1974 of the definition of aggression (resolution 3314) (60),
branded herein as the “most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use
of force”. Indeed, this UNGA normative resolution(61) marks the end of a
series of attempt to define aggression carried out since the LoN. However,
this resolution does not per se convey the criminalization of the aggression
as far as the international criminal responsibility of the individual (organ of a
State) is concerned.(62) One has to wait the 1996 ILC Draft Code whose
Article 16 states:
“An individual who, as leader or organizer, actively participates in or
orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of aggression
committed by a State shall be responsible for a crime of
aggression”(63)
Finally, the connection with resolution 3314 is made through Article 8bis
of the Rome Statute(64) which, while referring implicitly to the UNGA
(59) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. 445.
(60) Admittedly considered nowadays as genuinely reflecting CIL in this regard, see: G.
Distefano, “Use of force”, 2014, supra note 8.
(61) On the meaning of this concept, see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 383-391.
(62) On the contrary, Article 5 (2) provides that a “war of aggression is a crime against
international peace. Aggression gives rise to international responsibility”. The latter
refers to State international responsibility whilst the “crime” alludes to a specific form
of internationally wrongful act committed by a State of a particular gravity. Quite
ironically, though, the “crime of State”, as it was at that time known and as such
codified by the ILC in its provisional draft code on State responsibility, was eventually,
and regrettably, expunged from the final text adopted in 2001.
(63) YILC, 1996, Vol. II (Part II), para. 50.
(64) “1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means the planning,
preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of
aggression which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of
the Charter of the United Nations.
1. For the purpose of paragraph 1, “act of aggression” means the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
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resolution, enumerates the relevant elements of this international crime in a
more detailed way than the 1996 ILC Draft Code.(65)
Charter of the United Nations. Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration
of war, shall, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314
(XXIX) of 14 December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression:
1. (a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of
another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, resulting from
such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of
another State or part thereof;
2. (b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;
3. (c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of
another State;
4. (d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or
marine and air fleets of another State;
5. (e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the
conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in
such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;
6. (f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an act
of aggression against a third State;
7. (g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State of
such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substantial involvement
therein”.
(65) Article 8bis was inserted into ICC Statute by resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010
adopted by the Assembly of States parties to the Rome Statute. In fact, in 1998, at the
time of the adoption of the latter, there was no consensus with regard to the crime of
aggression and thus the question was remanded for further consideration. The real
bone of contention, though, did not lay in the definition of this crime, in other words
the substantive law, but strong tensions existed with regard to its institutional aspects.
In other words, how to reconcile the ICC’s jurisdiction over this crime and the UNSC
powers with regard to the determination of aggression within the system of collective
security. UNSC’s permanent members fretted above all that to bestow upon the ICC
jurisdiction on this crime would prejudice or even fetter UNSC’s competence in this
regard. That’s why the most salient ICC provisions related to the crime of aggression
are not aforementioned Article 8, but rather (long) Articles 15bis and 15ter which are
respectively (and aptly) named: “Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression
(State referral, proprio motu)” and “Exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of
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II.1.4. War Crimes
This category of international crimes probably encompasses the oldest
criminalization of individuals’ conducts.(66) Admittedly, this formula refers to
the so-called “grave breaches of IHL”, notably of 1949 GE Conventions (plus
the additional protocols) as well as of The Hague Conventions. As the very
formula clearly indicates, for a war crime to occur, the existence of an
armed conflict must be proved, either international armed conflict (IAC) or
(as it will be shown) a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) and the
existence of a nexus between the material act perpetrated by the accused
and the conflict must also be established.(67)
According to the World Court, and the dictum can hardly be challenged,
contemporary IHL is made up of two branches of the “Laws of war” which
have sprouted and developed alongside yet independently:
“A large number of customary rules have been developed by the
practice of States and are an integral part of the international law
relevant to the question posed. The "laws and customs of war" - as
they were traditionally called – were the subject of efforts at
codification undertaken in The Hague (including the Conventions of
aggression (Security Council referral)”. It is apparent that the last provision embodies
the sensitive balance of interests between international criminal justice (ICC) and
system of collective security (UNSC). This is all the more relevant since, as it will be
shown, ICC is not an organ of the UN while entertaining strong links with its system.
Other ICC’s provisions reflect the (could be sometimes tense) relations between UNSC
and ICC; for instance, Article 15ter (referral of a situation by the UNSC to the ICC) and
Article 16 (by virtue of which a “No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or
proceeded with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council,
in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has
requested the Court to that effect”. UNSC has indeed, alas, not disdained to make
recourse to this provision, e.g.: “UNSC Requests, consistent with the provisions of
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former
officials or personnel from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over
acts or omissions relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation,
shall for a twelve-month period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with
investigation or prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides
otherwise;” (para. 1).
(66) IMT, Judgement of 1st October 1946, p. pp. 449-463.
(67) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., paras. 55-59; ICC, The Prosecutor v.
Lubanga, 29 January 2007, paras. 286-293.
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1899 and 1907), and were based partly upon the St. Petersburg
Declaration of 1868 as well as the results of the Brussels Conference
of 1874. This "Hague Law" and, more particularly, the Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, fixed the rights
and duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations and limited
the choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy in an
international armed conflict. One should add to this the "Geneva
Law" (the Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949), which protects
the victims of war and aims to provide safeguards for disabled armed
forces personnel and persons not taking part in the hostilities. These
two branches of the law applicable in armed conflict have become so
closely interrelated that they are considered to have gradually
formed one single complex system, known today as international
humanitarian law. The provisions of the Additional Protocols of 1977
give expression and attest to the unity and complexity of that law” (68)
As it was the case for the previous category of international crimes, the
primeval sources of war crimes may be traced back to the IMT Statute, (69)
whose Article 6 (b) introduces the first (yet non exhaustive) enumeration of
conducts – during an international conflict(70) – the commission of which
engages criminal responsibility. Without entering into details, it noteworthy
to underline that the majority of these conducts amount to a violation of
The Hague Conventions; in other words, they are governed by the rules
regulating the conduct of hostilities.(71)
(68) ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996, para. 75 (p. 256).
(69) The existence of these crimes is practically unchallenged, bar very isolated, and
highly contestable doctrinal stands, such as: “We are not persuaded, even when
viewing them in 2010 through the prism of the many subsequent positive
developments, that those instruments notably The Hague Conventions could, in
1944, have formed a sufficiently sound and acknowledged legal basis for war crimes to
be regarded as having been precisely defined at that time, and for their definition to
have been foreseeable”, ECHR, Kononov v. Latvia, Judgement of 17 May 2010, para. 10
(separate opinion of Judge Costa joined by Judges Kalaydjieva AND Poalelungi).
(70) For the time being and until a recent past, war crimes could only be perpetrated
during an international armed conflict, i.e. grossly speaking between States.
(71) E.g.: “namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for
any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or illtreatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
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The other branch of IHL, i.e. “Geneva Law”, makes its appearance, as far
as international criminal law is concerned, through the four 1949 GE.
Indeed, it’s thanks to these universal international agreements that the very
formula “grave breaches” is introduced in an international convention
related to IHL. Each of these four conventions deals with a specific subjectmatter, respectively: I (wounded and sick in armed forces in the field), (72) II
(wounded, sick shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea),(73) III
(treatment of prisoners of war)(74) and IV (protection of civilian persons in
time of war).(75) Consequently, each of them devotes at least one specific
provision to the identification of “grave breaches” whose perpetration
“against persons and property protected by the present convention”(76)
leads to the entailment of international criminal responsibility (“penal
sanctions” in the jargon of the 1949 GE). In the same vein, Articles 11 (4) (77)

public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity;”.
(72) Article 50: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and
extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity
and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”.
(73) Article 51, the content of which is identical to Article 50/I (supra note 72).
(74) Article 130: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
compelling a prisoner of war to serve in the forces of the hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in this
Convention”
(75) Article 147: “wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological
experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health,
unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person,
compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully
depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the
present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly”.
(76) This formula is common to the four 1949 GE.
(77) “Any wilful act or omission which seriously endangers the physical or mental
health or integrity of any person who is in the power of a Party other than the one on
which he depends and which either violates any of the prohibitions in paragraphs 1
and 2 or fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph 3 shall be a grave breach
of this Protocol”

[College of Law UAE University]

Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2021

53

19

Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2021, No. 85 [2021], Art. 10

[International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual: A Quantum Leap for Man’s Humanity]

and 85(78) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 GE (thus applicable
international armed conflict) follow the same path, accruing to the conducts
likely to trigger penal sanctions.
International Criminal Tribunals are roughly in tune with the 1949 GE and
The Hague Conventions; ICC Statute adopts a two-tier structure since war
crimes are made up not only of the aforementioned “grave breaches” of the
four 1949 GE but also of: “other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework
of international law, namely …”.(79)In sum, “grave breaches” constitute a
narrower group within that of war crimes which hence encompasses “other
violations …”, too.
Besides, this provision embodies another two-layer approach having
regard to the international (or not) character of the armed conflict. Some
words must then be spent with regard to one of the major topics of IHL,
namely the qualification of an armed conflict in the context of war crime.
Grossly speaking, and for the purposes of the present volume, an IAC
comprises nowadays not only an armed conflict between two or more
States(80) but also “wars of national liberation”, i.e. conflicts where:
“peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien
occupation and against racist régimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations”(81)
On the other hand, NIAC find themselves below that threshold since they
are, according to Article 8 (2) f) of the ICC Statute, armed conflicts:

(78) “This provision, in addition to reiterate and complete the grave breaches
envisaged by the four 1949, GE adds a further list of violations « when committed
wilfully, in violation of the relevant provisions of this Protocol, and causing death or
serious injury to body or health” (Art. 85 (3)).
(79) A detailed list follows en suite.
(80) According by the way to Common Article 2 of the 1949 GE.
(81) Article 1 (4) 1977 P/I. On the concept of right of peoples to self-determination, see
G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 185-202.
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“that take place in the territory of a State when there is protracted
armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized
armed groups or between such groups”(82)
Below this threshold lays a final category of situations – within the
territory of a State(83) – characterized by “internal disturbances and tensions,
such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar
nature”, as called for this same provision in its first sentence. Again, this
definition of the lowest threshold of application of IHL represents the
ultimate definition of “what is not” a NIAC under PIL.
We have hitherto briefly expounded the major features of war crimes
while referring to their perpetration in the context of an IAC. Instinctively,
the reader has intuitively grasped that they may also occur during a NIAC.
True, yet this is certainly a recent novelty in international criminal law, in
fact a bold (and very welcome) jurisprudential conquest. Indeed, one has to
applaud the wise farsightedness of the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber judgement
in the Tadic case, whose contribution to PIL at large, as it will appear in
other sections of this volume, is highly precious. In the 1995 Judgement the
Appeals Chamber faced with the thorny question of whether war crimes
may be perpetrated in a NIAC developed a series of argumentation that
ultimately led to their existence. The relevant paragraph – of this founding
(82) This definition, which may considered as reflecting CIL in this regard, does in fact
transcend, and in some respects modify, previous categorizations purported by the GE
1949 (common Article 3) as well as by 1977 P/II, whose article 1 (1) is in effect more
stringent since it restricts the application of the P/II to “armed conflicts which take
place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry
out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol”. No
such conditions were set forward by Common Article of the 1949 GE which merely
requires that the conflict takes place on the territory of one of the HCP. Hence, in the
light of the foregoing it can be argued that Article 8 (2) f) ICC Statute codifies a CIL
definition of NIAC which has in fact modified both Common Article 3 1949 GE and
Article 1 (1) P/II. Otherwise, this situation may also be seen through the lens of the law
of treaties and more specifically the succession of treaties in time. See: G. Distefano,
2019, pp. 446-449.
(83) Or of several States, as it happens with regard to the so-called “Daesh” or “IS”
having taken up the arms against Iraqi and Syrian governments in their respective
territories.
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decision of international criminal law – undoubtedly deserves to be quoted
in its entirety:
“Since the 1930s, however, the aforementioned distinction has
gradually become more and more blurred, and international legal
rules have increasingly emerged or have been agreed upon to
regulate internal armed conflict. There exist various reasons for this
development. First, civil wars have become more frequent, not only
because technological progress has made it easier for groups of
individuals to have access to weaponry but also on account of
increasing tension, whether ideological, inter-ethnic or economic; as
a consequence the international community can no longer turn a
blind eye to the legal regime of such wars. Secondly, internal armed
conflicts have become more and more cruel and protracted, involving
the whole population of the State where they occur: the all-out
resort to armed violence has taken on such a magnitude that the
difference with international wars has increasingly dwindled (suffice
to think of the Spanish civil war, in 1936-39, of the civil war in the
Congo, in 1960-1968, the Biafran conflict in Nigeria, 1967-70, the civil
strife in Nicaragua, in 1981-1990 or El Salvador, 1980-1993). Thirdly,
the large-scale nature of civil strife, coupled with the increasing
interdependence of States in the world community, has made it more
and more difficult for third States to remain aloof: the economic,
political and ideological interests of third States have brought about
direct or indirect involvement of third States in this category of
conflict, thereby requiring that international law take greater account
of their legal regime in order to prevent, as much as possible, adverse
spill-over effects. Fourthly, the impetuous development and
propagation in the international community of human rights
doctrines, particularly after the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948, has brought about significant changes in
international law, notably in the approach to problems besetting the
world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been
gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually
the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est
(all law is created for the benefit of human beings) has gained a firm
foothold in the international community as well. It follows that in the
area of armed conflict the distinction between interstate wars and
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civil wars is losing its value as far as human beings are concerned.
Why protect civilians from belligerent violence, or ban rape, torture
or the wanton destruction of hospitals, churches, museums or private
property, as well as proscribe weapons causing unnecessary suffering
when two sovereign States are engaged in war, and yet refrain from
enacting the same bans or providing the same protection when
armed violence has erupted "only" within the territory of a sovereign
State? If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the
legitimate interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of
human beings, it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy
should gradually lose its weight”(84)
Thanks to this revolutionary finding by the ICTY’s Appeals Chamber it is
nowadays unchallenged that war crimes may be perpetrated in the context
of a NIAC,(85) as ICC Statute adamantly states in its Article 8 (2) c) and e).(86)
II.1.5. Crime against Humanity (CAH)
Introduced for the first time(87) in 1945 by the IMT through its Article 6
(c), the definition of this category of international crimes is, unlike crime of

(84) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 1995, para. 97. Among other elements, the
Appeals Chamber makes a decisive reference to the so-called Martens clause
(embodying the famous “elementary considerations of humanity”). In this regard, see:
G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 620-632.
(85) Quite correctly, ICTY made clear, instead, that “grave breaches” of the GE 1949
may, of course, occur only in the context of a NIAC (ibid, para. 80).
(86) Furthermore, ICTR Statute provided in its Article 4 the legal basis for this
criminalization (“Violations to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II”). In this regard, one may refer the reader back to the ICTR’s
Judgement in the Akayesu case (1998), in many respects as important as Tadic case (in
1995) has been to the ICTY, notably paras. 617-637.
(87) However, a timid prodrome may be traced back to the Allied (France, Great Britain
and Russia) Declaration issued in 1915 with regard to the massacres perpetrated
against Armenians in the Ottoman Empire: “For about a month the Kurd and Turkish
population of Armenia has been massacring Armenians with the connivance and often
assistance of Ottoman authorities … In view of these new crimes of Turkey against
humanity and civilization the Allied governments announce publicly to the Sublime
Porte that they will hold personally responsible these crimes all members of the
Ottoman government and those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres”
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genocide that flows from it, not uniform as one may in fact expect.
Moreover, there exist manifold definitions of crime against humanity within
municipal law of States, that happen sometimes, in addition, more accurate
than in PIL.
Perhaps the diversity of these definitions – especially in their penumbra –
is due to the fact that this category of international crimes represents, in a
higher degree compared to the two previous groups of crimes, a genuine
shrinking of States’ domestic jurisdiction (leaving aside the situation of the
rights of minorities). It is not too bold to assert then that HR are begotten
through the crime against humanity, and hence the normative “bing
bang”(88) of crime against humanity is undoubtedly Article 6 (c) of the IMT
Statute which reads as follows:
“namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and
other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”(89)

(May 29, 1915, italics added). See in this respect the fascinating book of Ph. Sands, East
West Street. On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, London, 2016
(88) In fact, Article 230 (penalties) of the 1920 Sèvres Treaty, which was meant to seal
the peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey but was never ratified by the latter,
provided that “the Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers
the persons whose surrender may be required by the latter as being responsible for
the massacres committed during the continuance of the state of war on territory
which formed part of the Turkish Empire on August 1, 1914” (emphasis added). Quite
intuitively, the massacres referred to are those concerning notably the Armenian
population of former Ottoman Empire. Paragraph 4 of this same provision envisaged
the possibility that the LoN created a “tribunal competent to deal with the said
massacres”, in such an instance Turkey would have been bound by the duty to defer to
it those accused of such crimes to it. Failing the entry into force of the Treaty of Sevres
(which was later on replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923 which embodied no
clauses of this nature), there has been neither domestic punishment nor international
repression for the aforementioned massacres.
(89) Italics added. See also the consonant definition of this crime in the US Control
Council Law n° 10 (December 1945) applicable to the US-occupied Germany allowing
the occupying power to prosecute German individuals on the account of this crime.
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The definition of this new category of international crimes implied and
required the existence of an IAC, i.e. the so-called nexus with a (unlawful)
war (that is to say a war of aggression). Furthermore, one ought to highlight
the explicit specification to the irrelevance of municipal law for the purposes
of qualifying such acts as being an international crime. This also proves the
newness of these crimes.
Yet, some authors as well States were not satisfied with the requirement
of a nexus, especially since the crime of genocide – indeed a offspring of
crime against humanity – which was on the verge of being defined (in 1948)
got rid of it infra II.1.6. And indeed this happened thanks to Article 3 of
ICTR Statute(90) which in a certain way replaced the nexus requiring an
“armed conflict” with “widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds”.(91) Next
conventional definitions(92) will confirm this substitution certainly due to the
parallel evolution of HR. During the diplomatic conference in Rome(93) a lot of
discussion took place around the formula “widespread or systematic”, for
example in comparison with ICTR Statute’s which has “and” instead of “or”. On
the grounds of a literal interpretation one may tentatively infer from the latter
that ICC’s formula is larger than ICTR’s. Yet, some ambiguities remain since
Article 7 (2) a) ICC seems to encompass both the systematic(94) and the
widespread characters;(95) in this connection, the policy (or plan), aiming at the

(90) True, the nexus was reaffirmed in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute which in effect
required the CAH to be perpetrated during an “armed conflict, whether international
or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population”. In this
connection, it ought to be added that the substantive definition contained in the
aforementioned provision has been considered fleshed up compared to that enshrined
in IMT Statute.
(91) Italics added.
(92) Article 2 of the Special Court for Sierra Leone Statute, Article 7 ICC Statute, Article
9 of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (which makes an explicit
renvoi to Article 7 ICC).
(93) It must be nonetheless underlined that quite a few delegations argued to maintain
this nexus during the conference.
(94) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002, para. 98.
(95) This section of Article 7 reads as follows: “ ‘Attack directed against any civilian
population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple thus widespread
commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant
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perpetration of one of the CAH while not being one of its constitutive
elements, undoubtedly represents a compelling evidence that the attack
directed against the civilian population was widespread and systematic.(96) It is
hence wise to await a further jurisprudential clarification.
In any case, and at this stage, the following elements may be distilled from
the definition of CCA embodied in Article 7 ICC Statute. Firstly, the attack must
be directed, contrariwise to war crimes, to the civilian population. Secondly,
the attack in question does not have to be perforce a military attack, that is to
say an attack triggered by military forces. Thirdly, the attack must occur
“pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit
such attack”, hence a CAH may also be perpetrated by NSA.(97) Fourthly, the
actor of a CAH must act “with knowledge of this attack”. This seems to
encompass a sort of special intent which nevertheless is less hard to prove
than the dolus specialis requires for the genocide. Therefore, lack of this
knowledge will prevent the existence of a CAH, leaving only possible war
crimes or simple “killing”.(98)Fifthly, as far as the “criminal intent” or motive
(dolus) is concerned, no such element is required,(99) bar in one of the eleven
acts listed in the definition of CAH, i.e. persecution.(100) However, motive
remains useful in view of determining the penalty that hence will be higher
without it (it is indeed considered as an “aggravating circumstance”).
Regarding the list of acts likely to constitute a CAH, it appears clearly that
it is much longer than that of Article 6 (c) IMT, and again this is due to the
tremendous evolution of HR since 1945, especially to their substance. For
instance, apartheid, torture and “enforced disappearance of persons” may
surely be ranked among the most recent acquisitions. Another great novelty
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy systematic to commit such
attack”.
(96) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2004, para. 225, whereby the Appeals Chamber
reversed Trial Chamber’s judgement (2001, para. 685). In the same vein : ICTY, The
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, 2002, para. 98.
(97) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 100-101.
(98) However, as attested by Article 7 (paragraph 2 of the Introduction) of the
“Elements of Crimes”, this condition must be loosely construed to the extent that it
does not require “proof that the perpetrator had knowledge of all characteristics of
the attack or the precise details of the plan or policy of the State or organization”.
(99) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1999, para. 275.
(100) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., para. 636.
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is represented by the new generation of CAH constituted by the so-called
“gender crimes”, comprising “forced pregnancy”; this acquisition, though,
was not carried without some difficulty, since some States which banned
abortion (Holy See, Ireland, etc.) did not clearly intend the latter to be
criminalized, that’s why an interpretation of this new crime took account of
this need.(101) On the other hand, other acts which were within the compass
of Article 6 (c) have been subsequently developed and extended. (102) On the
contrary, other alleged CAH, strenuously defended by some delegations in
Rome, have not been included: economic embargo, terrorism as well as
mass starvation.
In some other cases, yet, Article 7 ICC has ended up – at least pending
further jurisprudential refining – restricting the scope of CAH. For instance,
with regard to persecutions, section 1 (h) of this provision defines this crime as
“Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial,
national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or
other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under
international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or
any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”. If, on one hand, the
substantive list is noticeably larger than previous definitions, on the other,
the last fragment (in added italics) seems to include a nexus which was not
hitherto required. At first glance, indeed, this condition may lead to a
restriction of the scope of this CAH. One may wonder why this has
happened; a tentative and intuitive answer could be that States at large –
and some more specifically – are at pains in apprehending this CAH(103) and

(101) Article 7 (2) f) of ICC Statute indeed provides that by “forced pregnancy” is
meant “the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent
of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as
affecting national laws relating to pregnancy”. The last phrase (in added italics)
specifically addresses this sensitive question by excluding from the definition of this
CAH legislations and acts adopted thereof which relate to the national policy in matter
of pregnancy.
(102) In this regard, one may mention deportation which has been supplemented by
“forcible transfer of population” which refers to ethnic cleansing within the borders of
a single (or same) State.
(103) Article 7 (1) h) of the Elements of Crimes provides that “the perpetrator severely
deprived, contrary to international law, one or more persons of fundamental rights”.
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hence they feel the need, to all intents and purposes, to limit its material
field of application.
Finally, this definition is open-ended one to the extent that Article 7 (1) k)
sets forth “Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health”
may be qualified as CAH.(104) Thanks to this last section of Article 7 ICC –
aptly termed as umbrella clause – ICTR was able to consider – because of an
identical provision – the fact of enforcing Tutsi women to be exposed naked
before notably (Hutus) men as a CAH.(105)

II.1.6. Crime of genocide
II.1.6.1. Birth of the Concept and its Definition
In some respects, this species of international crime is the most famous in
the eyes of the layman who even may tend to subsume – erroneously of
course – all the others under it. Historically speaking, genocide is certainly a
sub-category of CAH even though it originally found its place within Article 6
(c) IMT.(106) The very term of genocide is made up from the Greek word
“γένος”, i.e. race, and a Latin verb, “caedo” (infinite “cædere”), i.e. “I kill”. In
1944, Raphael Lemkin, a Polish lawyer of Jewish origin, published a book
entitled: “Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation - Analysis of

(104) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, 2002, paras. 234-240.
(105) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, paras. 429, 447.
(106) Indeed, while not being mentioned in the very terms of this provision, the
Prosecutor got availed of in his Indictment (Count Three): US et al. v. Goering et al.,
The Trial of the Major War Criminals before the IMT (1945-1946), pp. 43-44.
Furthermore, US Military tribunal prosecuted and condemned upon this indictment:
US v. Alstoetter, III Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
under Control Council Law n° 10 (1951), p. 954. Even though it was originally
subsumed on Count 3, i.e. War Crimes (Indictment, adopted 8 October 1945, Trial of
the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1947,
43.
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Government - Proposals for Redress”,(107) in which he sketched a definition of
genocide, while coining, obviously, for the first time the very term:
“Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the
actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their
individual capacity, but as members of the national group” (108)
As it will be delved into later on, the intimate relation between an
individual and a specific group are material in order to grasp the very
essence of this crime; the belonging of the former to the latter makes him
(her) a target of the unlawful action. Therefore, it is due to this link that the
individual is targeted so that the ultimate victim of action is the group
through the individual appertaining to it. The definition is larger and
narrower than that purported by the UN 1948 Genocide Convention(109) at
the same time, since it covers cultural genocide while at the same time
taking solely into account the national group.
Thanks also the IMT jurisprudence, the definition and autonomous
character of the crime of genocide underwent a rapid ripening since in 1946,
UNGA resolution 96 (I) not only enshrines for the first time the
criminalization of genocide but also affirmed that it represents:
“a denial of the right of existence of entire human groups, as
homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual human beings”
Hence, the nexus between individual (and crime directed against) and the
group to which he (or she) belongs (and the crime directed against) are
intimately intertwined on the grounds of specific intention (dolus specialis)
according to which the ultimate goal of the crime is to “destroy entirely or in
part” it.(110)
(107) The uprising of the ghetto of Warsaw and its bloody repression are not without
influence on the awareness by the author of the terrible policy waged by Nazis in
Europe and surely constitutes a point of non-return in the awakening of the legal
conscience of mankind (UNGA resolution 96 (I)). See also: ICJ, Application of Genocide
Convention, 2007, para. 193 (p. 125). See in this regard: Ph. Sands, East West Street.
On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, London, 2016.
(108) Washington, 1944, at 79.
(109) A masterly commentary of this law-making convention: The UN Genocide
Convention. A Commentary, ed. by P. Gaeta, Oxford, 2009.
(110) UNGA Resolution 96 (I), 11 December 1946. It is noteworthy to observe that this
resolution did not encompass, contrary to Lemkin’s definition, cultural genocide.
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Lastly, “in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge” (111),
UNGA adopted unanimously on 9 December 1948 the Genocide
Convention.(112) A brief perusal of the main substantive provisions of this
Convention is not without interest especially because the definition
enshrined therein will not noticeably evolve through the successive
international treaties up to and included ICC Statute, contrariwise to the
other international crimes, as we have seen.
In accordance with Article 1, genocide – which is established as “a crime
under international law” – may be perpetrated either in time of peace and
war and hence high contracting parties commit themselves to prevent and
punish it. It ought to be observed in this respect that UN Genocide
Convention sets thus forward an obligation for States to prevent and punish
genocide while at the same time making it a crime if committed by an
individual hence engaging the latter’s international responsibility. In 2007
ICJ, unsurprisingly held that a State party to it may also entail its
responsibility for committing genocide and not only for not preventing
and/or punishing it. Indeed, even though “such an obligation not to
perpetrate a genocide is not expressly imposed by the actual terms of the
Convention”, this obligation flows from a combined construction of two
provisions of the Convention, namely I and III, alongside with the Preamble
(i.e. contextual interpretation). The Court affirms indeed that in its view:
“taking into account the established purpose of the Convention, the
effect of Article I is to prohibit States from themselves committing
genocide. Such a prohibition follows, first, from the fact that the
Article categorizes genocide as a ‘crime under international law’: by
agreeing to such a categorization, the State parties must logically be
undertaking not to commit the act so described. Secondly, it follows
from the expressly stated obligation to prevent the commission of
acts of genocide. That obligation requires the States parties, inter
alia, to employ the means at their disposal … to prevent persons or
groups not directly under their authority from committing an act of
genocide or any of the other acts mentioned in Article III. It would be
paradoxical if States were thus under an obligation to prevent, so far
(111) Preamble of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention, which entered into force in
1951.
(112) UNGA Resolution 216 (III) A.
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as within their power, commission of genocide by persons over which
they have a certain influence, but were not forbidden to commit such
acts through their own organs, or persons over whom they have such
firm control that their conduct is attributable to the State concerned
under international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide
necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide”(113)
Article II enshrines the definition of genocide which requires both the
commission of an act (“actus reus”) and the specific intention (“dolus
specialis”) aiming at destroying entirely or partially a national, racial or
religious group. Therefore, as already underscored, the individual which is
affected by the criminal act is transcended by its appurtenance to the group
in point which is then ultimately the true target of the genocide. The
following acts convey – and substantiate – the specific intention to destroy
the group concerned: a) “killing members of the group”, in effect at least
two; b) “causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group”; c)
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part”; d) “imposing measures
intended to prevent births within the group”; e) “forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group”. By way of consequence, the UN
Genocide Convention criminalizes the following acts mentioned in Article III:
a) the commission of genocide; b) “conspiracy to commit genocide”, which
will not be encompassed by ICC later on; c) “direct and public incitement to
commit genocide”; d) “attempt to commit genocide”; e) “complicity in
genocide”. As provided in Article IV, any individual may commit genocide:
“constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals”.
Articles VI to IX make up the institutional part of the Convention, i.e. they
relate to the means of its implementation through the setting up of the
different forms of jurisdiction and responsibilities (individual and States
parties). They will examined later on (infra III.2).
As already highlighted, the last of the international crimes, in order of
appearance in PIL, undoubtedly features the most resilient definition insofar
as it has barely evolved since 1948. Without entering into a tedious
enumeration, ICTY (article 4) as well as ICTR (2) Statutes repeat pari passu

(113) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 166 (p. 113; italics added).
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the definition of genocide embodied in Article II of the UN Genocide.(114) The
same can be said as regards ICC Statute (Article 6) save the deletion of
“conspiracy” as one of the elements of this crime enumerated in Article
III,(115) the definition being thus the same as that enshrined in Article II of the
UN Genocide.
Against the backdrop of this (unvaried) definition of genocide, it is not
without interest to say a few words on the assets and shortcomings of the
1948 UN Genocide Convention. Among its assets, one has to mention,
beside the definition of this crime, the criminalization of the “conspiracy”
aiming at committing a genocide and the reaffirmation of a parallel
international responsibility of individual and State which failed to prevent
and/or to punish the author(s) of a genocide, but also for having
perpetrated the very crime of genocide through its own organs.(116) On the
negative side, one may regret the failure to include cultural genocide. (117)
(114) Likewise: Article 1 of the 1968 “Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”, UNGA resolution 2391
(XXIII); Article 1 (para. 1) of the 1974 Council of Europe “Convention on the NonApplicability of Statutory Limitation to Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes”; ILC
1996 Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, UN doc. A/51/10,
paras. 46-48, whose Article 17 borrows word-for-word the definition in Article 2 of the
1948 UN Genocide Convention.
(115) Indeed, “conspiracy” is not listed in Article 6 of the “Elements of Crimes” of the
ICC.
(116) Supra note 113.
(117) In its wake, ICJ has rejected the allegation of a crime of cultural genocide: “The
rejection of proposals to include within the Convention political groups and cultural
genocide also demonstrates that the drafters were giving close attention to the
positive identification of groups with specific distinguishing well-established, some said
immutable, characteristics. A negatively defined group cannot be seen in that way”,
Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 194 (p. 125). Likewise, para. 334 (p.
186). The Court reiterated its stance in the Application of Genocide Convention
(Croatia v. Serbia), 2008, para. 141 (p. 465). However, ICTY argued that even though
cultural genocide is not within the compass of the definition of genocide as an
international crime, the mere fact of destroying all the cultural (land-)marks of a group
(otherwise defined) may well prove the special intent to destroy it: The Prosecutor v.
Krstic, 2001, para. 580: “The Trial Chamber is aware that it must interpret the
Convention with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. It therefore
recognises that, despite recent developments, customary international law limits the
definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all
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Furthermore, the Convention adopts a narrow definition of the belonging to
one of the groups encompassed by Article II, insofar as it is based on the
involuntary appurtenance of the individuals, i.e. since their birth, thus
excluding the voluntary belonging of individual to a group whatsoever, for
instance genocide on “political grounds”.(118) Moreover, one may also
deplore that the four groups within the compass of genocide (national,
ethnic, racial and religious) are not accurately defined. On another key, that
of implementation, the means provided to this effect by the 1948 UN
Genocide Convention are far from being optimal.
ICJ has stated already back in 1951 that the crime of genocide appertains
to customary international law in a famous dictum which deserved to be
quoted extensively:
“The principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognized by civilized nations as binding on States, even without any
conventional obligation … The Convention was manifestly adopted
for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult
to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a
greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the
very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm
and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a
convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their
own; they merely have, one and au, a common interest, namely, the
accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d'être
of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one
cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or
or part of the group. Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological
characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to
that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall
under the definition of genocide. The Trial Chamber however points out that where
there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the
cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks
which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the
group. In this case, the Trial Chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent
to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to
members of the group”. Likewise: ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para.
344 (p. 186).
(118) Supra note 117.
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of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights
and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by
virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure
of all its provisions”(119)
Other international jurisdictions have by all means followed in the ICJ’s
footsteps by reaffirming the customary character of the definition contained
through its illustration by specific examples.(120)
II.1.6.2. “Mens rea” & “Actus reus”, or respectively the
material act and (special) intent
The distinctive feature of genocide as an international crime is by far the
requirement of the “mens rea”, in sum the intent underlying the criminal act
itself. This Latin formula, which deeply pervades criminal law, can be literally
translated into: “guilty mind”, conveying thus one of the elements of
criminal responsibility, i.e. the intent to harm by performing a (criminal) act,
that is to say the “actus reus”. Hence, the existence of both elements must
be then verified for the crime of genocide to occur.
II.1.6.2.1. “Mens rea” and the crime of genocide:
the intention to destroy entirely or partially a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group (NERR)
Contrariwise to the other international crimes, genocide requires then a
specific intention (“dolus specialis”) which is at the origins of the act. The
simple “dolus” (intention) is not sufficient as a “specific intention” (“dolus
specialis”) is required, i.e., in accordance with Article II of the UN Genocide
Convention, an act committed with the “intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”. Therefore, the individual
affected by the criminal act of genocide is not for instance killed for what he
(or she) is, but on the grounds of his (or her) appurtenance to one of the

(119) ICJ, Reservations to Genocide Convention, 1951, p. 23.
(120) Eichmann case, Israel District Court, 1961, para. 80; ICTR, The Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, 2008, paras. 499-522; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 66-77, 8083, 100-108; ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 2001, paras. 44-57, 66-77; ICTY, The
Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2001, paras. 549-550, 569-572, 580-598; ICTY, The Prosecutor v.
Krstic, 2004, paras. 12-23.
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groups listed in the definition.(121) This intent – which seems very much like
aggravated criminal intention – is required in addition to the criminal intent
of killing, or causing serious bodily harms, or any other acts enumerated in
Article II. By way of consequence, “recklessness” or knowing negligence
(“culpa”) are not sufficient.(122) As the ICTR made clear in the Akayesu case:
“Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Romancontinental legal systems. It is required as a constitutive element of
certain offences and demands that the perpetrator have the clear
intent to cause the offence charged. According to this meaning,
special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which
offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the
physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator” (123)
This special intent – quintessential of the mens rea as regards the crime
of genocide – may either be corroborated by the very confession of the
suspect or be objectively inferred from the relevant factual circumstances.
With regard to the latter, ICTY deduced the special intent from the analysis
of the facts brought before it: in the case in point, it reached the conclusion
that a genocide had been perpetrated in Srebrenica by raising two separate
yet intertwined questions: a) what is the targeted group?; then, b) is there
any special intent in targeting this specific group? In the case in point: a) the
group was exclusively made up by Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica who
belonged to the group of Bosnian Muslim; b) the intent to eradicate this
group in a given geographical area may be considered as genocide. Indeed,
the intention to destroy entirely or partially a group is tantamount to
endeavour to destroy a part thereof as opposed to other individuals (even
regardless of their high number) who do not appertain to it. Therefore, it is
not required to destroy the entire group, the intention to eliminate only a
part of it in a given geographic area suffices to infer the mens rea and hence
the crime of genocide. In effect, the fact of systematically killing in this area
(121) Hannah Arendt lucidly observed that the banalization of evil has been made
possible thanks to the depersonalization of the victim (the individual) transcended by
his appurtenance to the group (Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil,
New York, 1963).
(122) On the contrary, the “wilful blindness” suffices to substantiate the mens rea. For
instance, a guard in a concentration camp may not pretend that he did not know what
was going on.
(123) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 518.
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the members of a part of this group may entail genocide. Conversely, to kill
here and there some members of this group might likely not prove the
specific intent to destroy the entire group. Referring again to Srebrenica, all
Bosnian Muslims males have been killed, alongside with the expulsion of the
rest of the population from this area and the destruction of mosques and
houses belonging to this religious group. By way of consequence, this policy
resulted in the disappearance of all male Bosnians able to fight to retake
Srebrenica as well as in the impairment of reproduction within this religious
group.
II.1.6.2.2. “Actus reus”: the
constituting the crime of genocide

material

act

The material act that concretises the special intent to destroy in whole or
in part a group may result in an action or inaction;(124) this feature applies to
all acts exhaustively listed in the definition of the crime of genocide. The
most obvious example of genocide by inaction is by way of “deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part” (Article II c) of the 1948 Genocide
Convention).
Furthermore, whilst for the acts of “killing” (a), “Causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group” (b) and “Forcibly transferring
children of the group to another group” (e), the final outcome must be
proved, the same is not all required for the acts of “deliberately inflicting on
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part” (c) and those of “imposing measures intended to
prevent births within the group” (d).(125)
Some words must be briefly spent for each of these acts. Regarding (a), in
the light of the Akayesu case, 2 material elements are required: i) the death
of the member of a group; and, b) that the individual has deceased as a
result of an unlawful act or of an inaction of the accused or of his (or her)
subordinate. It goes without saying that if an individual is killed in a context
of genocide, but he (or she) does not belong to the targeted group, then this
(124) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Sikirica et al., 2001, paras. 15, 40-42.
(125) The numbering of the acts forming a crime of genocide is drawn from Article II of
the 1948 UN Genocide Convention; as it has been made clear this list is the same for
the ICC as well as for the ICTY and ICTR.
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acts does not amount to an act of genocide.(126) A thornier question is that
of the meaning of “killing” especially by taking into account the other
working language of both the ICC Statute and the 1948 UN Genocide
Convention. While the French text has retained the word “meurtre” –
etymologically winking to “murder”, which requires the intention – English
text has opted for the more neutral “killing” which may also comprise “to
cause death by negligence or recklessness”. Thus, in accordance with the
usual rules of interpretation of international treaties as adjusted by the
general principles of international criminal law (i.e. “favor rei”,(127) that is to
say the more favourable interpretation for the accused must be referred to),
the term “killing” has better chances to be referred to instead of “murder”.
This conception has been indeed embraced by the ICTR in the
aforementioned Akayesu case,(128) whilst, pending further jurisprudential

(126) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 710.
(127) See infra note 128.
(128) “500. With regard to Article 2(2)(a) of the Statute, like in the Genocide
Convention, the Chamber notes that the said paragraph states "meurtre" in the French
version while the English version states "killing". The Trial Chamber is of the opinion
that the term "killing" used in the English version is too general, since it could very well
include both intentional and unintentional homicides, whereas the term "meurtre",
used in the French version, is more precise. It is accepted that there is murder when
death has been caused with the intention to do so, as provided for, incidentally, in the
Penal Code of Rwanda which stipulates in its Article 311 that "Homicide committed
with intent to cause death shall be treated as murder". 501. Given the presumption
of innocence of the accused, and pursuant to the general principles of criminal law, the
Chamber holds that the version more favourable to the accused should be upheld and
finds that Article 2(2) (a) of the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the
definition of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which "meurtre"
(killing) is homicide committed with the intent to cause death. The Chamber notes in
this regard that the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, show that the
proposal by certain delegations that premeditation be made a necessary condition for
there to be genocide, was rejected, because some delegates deemed it unnecessary
for premeditation to be made a requirement; in their opinion, by its constitutive
physical elements, the very crime of genocide, necessarily entails premeditation”.
Therefore, the killing must be intentional, yet without premeditation. In the same vein:
ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, paras. 484-485; ICTY, The Prosecutor v.
Stakic, 2003, para. 515.
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refinement, ICC’s Elements of Crimes has, on the contrary, enshrined an
opposite view(129), thus discarding the intentional component of “killing”.
With regard to (b), that is to say “Causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group”, States have thus accepted the idea that ICC
punishes acts of physical violence which have not (yet) attained the
threshold of “killing”. On the contrary, the very concept of “mental harm” is
far more problematic.(130) The precise scope of this material act of crime
remains thus particularly tendentious.(131) To cause a serious bodily or
mental harm does not mean perforce that the harm in point to be
permanent and irremediable. It seems in fact widely accepted that physical
harm does not require to be permanent,(132) while it is more debated with
regard to the mental harm wherein the irremediableness character might be
required.(133) In any case, it is on the contrary undisputed, that a serious
bodily and mental harm within the compass of the definition of the crime of
genocide comprises the following acts: torture, rape, sexual violence,
inhuman and degrading treatments.
With regard to (c), that is to say to “deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part”, this “actus reus” must be construed “as … methods of
destruction by which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the
members of the group, but which, ultimately, seek their physical
destruction”.(134) Without being exhaustive, Article 2 (2) of the ICTR Statute
encompasses “ the subjection of a group of people to a subsistence diet,
systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical
(129) Through the lens of “Elements of Crimes” attached to the ICC Statute takes care
to underscore that “The term ‘killed’ is interchangeable with the term ‘caused death’”,
Article 6 a) 1, footnote 2.
(130) China, for instance, insisted for the necessary requirement of the use of
psychotropic substances, but the proposal was rejected.
(131) Again, in the eyes of the ICTR, rape and sexual violence may at the same time
result in a serious bodily and mental harm: ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu,
1998, paras. 731-734.
(132) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 516.
(133) “Mental harm is understood to mean more than the minor or temporary
impairment of mental faculties”, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, para.
510.
(134) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 505.
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services below minimum requirement”.(135) In the same vein and in the light
of international jurisprudence, one may also mention: withholding sufficient
living accommodations, deportation,(136) razing of villages, destruction of
property, burning of harvest, far-reaching health and environmental
damages, etc. It clearly appears that in this category of “actus reus”, the
omission is particularly important; however, this inaction may not be
equated to mere negligence, but it requires an intentional component (dolus
specialis). Lastly, contrariwise to the two previous criminal material acts, the
“actus reus” in question does not require the actual fulfilment of the
action/omission, but the “group conditions of life must be calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”.(137)
In respect of (d), that is to say, “imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group”, in the same manner as the previous criminal
material act, it is not necessary to demonstrate that aim has been fulfilled.
In the same vein, one ought to underscore that “measures intended to
prevent births within the group” must not be calculated to destroy the
group; it suffices that they “prevent the births within the group”. This kind
of measures are indeed often instrumental to a genocidal plan, as it had
been the case for the Holocaust perpetrated by the Nazis during WWII. In
the light of the aforesaid, the following acts are within the compass of the
“actus reus” in point: sterilization and or compulsory abortion, castrations;
segregation of sexes, obstacles to marriage (within the group), etc. (138) That’s
why it is not inappropriate to speak of these material acts as constituting a
“biologic genocide”. In this connection, “rape” might also be included as the
ICTY put forward: “The systematic rape of women … is in some cases

(135) Ibid., para. 506. For the purposes of a systemic construction of the material acts
encompassed by this specific “actus reus”, one might also refer to the relevant
provisions of 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.
(136) Not to be mistaken with mere expulsion which is not per se a material act likely
to trigger the crime of genocide: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 519.
(137) For instance, Israel Supreme Court (Attorney-General (Israel) v Adolf Eichmann
36 ILR 5, 1962, para. 80) considered that this “actus reus” applied only to the survivors
of the Holocaust; on the contrary, for those who had been actually exterminated by
the Nazis, that was a “killing”, i.e. another material act encompassed by the definition
of the crime of genocide under (a).
(138) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 507.
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intended to transmit a new ethnic identity to the child”.(139) Likewise,
measures subsumed under heading may also feature a psychological
dimension (and not only a physical one) as the ICTR made clear with regard
to rape or sexual violence:
“The Chamber notes that measures intended to prevent births
within the group may be physical but can also be mental. For
instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the
person raped refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way
that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not
to procreate”(140)
The last category of material acts amounting to a crime of genocide, i.e.
“Forcibly(141) transferring children of the group to another group” (d), may
raise a few questions, insofar as 1948 UN Genocide Convention’s drafters
had rejected cultural genocide. Indeed, this “actus reus” may in some
respects be misled with the latter. In this case, perhaps as a way to
reinvigorate this type of genocide, the actual result of the action must be
proved fort the crime to be perpetrated. In other words, one has to show
that children are actually transferred from a protected group to another,
even though ICTR has gone further admitting also the threat to do so.(142)
Finally an ancillary issue to the application of this provision must be
addressed, i.e. the UN 1948 Convention does not specify what is meant by
“children”. Therefore, the question must be sought elsewhere and, through
systemic interpretation, a potent hint to this effect can be found in the UN
1989 Convention on the rights of the child, whose Article 1 states that “a
child means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless
under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier”. However,
the threshold appears to be too high since, if the aim is to prevent for a child
to lose its roots, then at 17 years old it is unlikely that he could be deprived
of its culture.

(139) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Karadzic and Mladic, 1996, para. 94. In the same vein:
ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 507.
(140) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 508.
(141) This adverb must be construed as including not only physical acts of coercion but
also threats of intimidation (e.g. aboriginal children in Australia).
(142) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 506.
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Two aspects related to the crime of genocide and its application:
identification of group and difference and similarities with the CAH
II.1.6.2.3. Identification of protected group under
the concept of genocide
The concept of group is pivotal in view of grasping the crime of genocide.
As shown by international jurisprudence, a group must be stable and
permanently constituted, thus the automatic (as opposed to voluntary)
appurtenance of an individual (the victim) to it. Hence, the group is
definitively circumscribed as well as those individuals belonging to it. In the
Akayesu case, ICTR rebutted the allegation according to which a genocide
can be perpetrated against a “more ‘mobile’” group, i.e. that people are free
to adhere to it, for instance a group founded upon political values.(143)
Furthermore, a group must be defined in a positive way (in sum “who those
peoples are”) and not negatively (i.e. “who they are not”), (144) since the very
concept of genocide implies the aim of destructing (entirely of partially) a
group by targeting an individual on the grounds of its appurtenance to it.
In this same case, ICTR provides us with useful remarks with regard to the
four types of “group” against which genocide may be directed (i.e. NERR). A
“national” group refers to a group made up of human beings “perceived to
share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of
rights and duties”.(145) A “ethnic” group, instead, comprises all individuals
sharing “a common language and culture”;(146) whilst a “racial” group

(143) “On reading through the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention, it
appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting only ‘stable’
groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined
by birth, with the exclusion of the more ‘mobile’ groups which one joins through
individual voluntary commitment, such as political and economic groups. Therefore, a
common criterion in the four types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is
that membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its
members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often
irremediable manner”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 511.
(144) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 193 (p. 125) ; also para. 196
(pp. 125-126). Likewise, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 512.
(145) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 512. The Tribunal rightly
makes reference to the ICJ’s decision in the Nottebohm case ICJ, 1955, p. 23).
(146) Ibid., para. 513.
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focuses on the “hereditary physical traits often identified with a
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, national or religious
factors.”(147) Lastly, a “religious” group is made of peoples who “share the
same religion, denomination or mode of worship”.(148)
Closely intertwined with this question lays the crux of the problem, i.e.
how to identify a group, be it national, ethnic, racial or religious. Indeed,
ICTR was faced with the thorny problem of the distinction – and the nature
thereof – between Hutus and Tutsi who allegedly belonged hence to two
different “ethnic” groups. To this effect, the Tribunal made recourse in turn
to identity cards(149) as well as to testimony of witness as proof of the
appurtenance. These two elements of evidence reveal in fact two different
approaches to the question, i.e. the objective and subjective ones. The
former emphasizes on the external standpoint, in other words how peoples
are seen and categorized from the outside world (identity cards,(150) official
and public statements, etc.)(151) whilst the latter stresses on the selfperception, in sum how the individual concerned sees himself and hence
considers himself as belonging to one group or not. As the Court seemed to
hint that the two approaches must be combined hence yielding to a
“combined subjective-objective approach”. (152) In another case, though,
ICTR, bound to elaborate on the characteristics of a ethnic group, observes
that the appurtenance to it has to depend on three (alternate) criteria: a)
the individuals have to share a common langue and culture (i.e. objective
(147) Ibid., para. 514. The Tribunal seems to insist that in order to demonstrate the
appurtenance of an individual to a “racial” group, priority must be given to the
genotype (genetic identity) in lieu of the phenotype (its appearance or morphology).
The question was far from being academic in the Rwandan case where the distinction
between Hutus and Tutsis was “popularly” based on physical traits which might be
more easily observed than the “genetic heritage”. Likewise: ICTR, The Prosecutor v.
Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para. 98.
(148) Ibid., para. 515. Likewise: ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda
Ruzindana, 1999, para. 98.
(149) Ibid., paras. 123, 170.
(150) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para.
35.
(151) In Nazi Germany, for instance, the obligation to bear openly – sown on a garment
– the Star of David (better “Shield of David”) made to the German Jews was a clear
“mark” of appurtenance to a religious group.
(152) ICJ, Application of Genocide Convention, 2007, para. 191 (p. 124).
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elements), or b) they consider themselves as belonging to the group
(victim’s subjective element), or c) they are identified (perceived) as such by
the outside world, including and especially, by the author of the genocide
(author’s subjective element).(153) Hence, this case would tend to
corroborate the thesis according to which, in view of grasping a group, a
tribunal has to make recourse to three alternate (subjective and objective)
elements. Yet again, in another case, ICTR stresses even further the
subjective element; assuming that the very concept of group under the 1948
UN Convention (bar the national ones, which is objectively and more easily
assessable) does not enjoy a universal definition, the Tribunal reaches the
conclusion that this concept is definitely more subjective that objective.
Therefore, what matters is how the victim is perceived by the author (“mens
rea”) of the genocide as belonging to the group in point; alternatively, it may
be made recourse to the self-interpretation by the victim himself. In sum,
the two sides of the subjective approach may concur to the identification of
the group, first, and to the appurtenance, then, of the victim to it.
II.1.6.2.4. Crime of genocide as opposed to Crime
against humanity
The comparison between these two international crimes is in all regards
evident, not least because the two share a common origin, better, as it has
been previously outlined crime of genocide is historically speaking a species
of a wider category of crimes, i.e. CAH. Indeed, as the District Court of
Jerusalem (Israel) stated in the famous Eichmann case:
“It is hardly necessary to add that the ‘crime against the Jewish
People”, which constitutes the crime of ‘genocide’ is nothing but the
gravest type of ‘crime against humanity’ (and all the more so because
both under Israeli law and under the UN 1948 Convention a special
intention is requisite for its commission of a ‘crime against
humanity’). Therefore, all that has been said in the Nuremberg

(153) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Clément Kayishema and Obeda Ruzindana, 1999, para.
98: “An ethnic group is one whose members share a common language and culture; or,
a group which distinguishes itself, as such (self-identification); or, a group identified as
such by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)”.
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principles on the ‘crime against humanity’ applies a fortiori to the
‘crime against the Jewish People’”(154)
Therefore, it is unsurprising that as far as the “actus reus” is concerned
their similarities far exceed the scarce oddities.(155) In both cases: a) we are
faced to grave crimes committed by individuals; b) they are not made up
from isolated behaviours disconnected between them, on the contrary they
are underpinned by a plan or policy; c) very often, it is the fact of a State or
at the very least with the latter’s acquiescence or even connivance; d)
criminal acts are targeted against civilian population (in this respect they
differ substantially from crimes of war). Due to the profound similarities
with regard to the material acts comprised by these two crimes, quite a few
overlaps may occur between genocide and CAH. In fact, to kill all the
members of a protected group (national, ethnic, religious or racial) in a
systematic and widespread manner “with intent to destroy” it, constitutes
both a genocide and a CAH.(156) On the contrary, torture arbitrary
imprisonment make up a CAH whilst to kill human beings belonging to
anyone of the protected groups result (only) in a genocide.
Hence, if there are some differences between them, and there are
indeed, they must lay perforce on the plane of mens rea, where in effect no
overlap can be found. As it has been authoritatively observed, while is
irrefutable that “all true crimes require proof of intent”(157), that of
genocide stands apart from the other international crimes insofar as the
mens rea is specially characterized, thence the so-called “dolus specialis” or
special intent.(158)
(154) Israel v. Eichmann, Supreme Court of Jerusalem, judgement of 29/05/1962, ILR,
vol. 36 para. 26. Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995, paras. 139-141.
(155) For instance, forcible deportation is comprised within CAH and does not amount
to a crime of genocide: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, 2001, para. 519; ICTY,
The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 519.
(156) On the overlaps between CAH and crime of genocide, see: ICTR, The Prosecutor
v. Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, paras. 628-636.
(157) W. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, Cambridge,
2001, p. 213.
(158) “Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-continental
legal systems. It is required as a constitutive element of certain offences and demands
that the perpetrator have the clear intent to cause the offence charged. According to
this meaning, special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which offence
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As regards CAH, historically the parent crime of genocide, one has to
verify the intent to commit (“dolus generalis”) one of the constitutive
material (and criminal) acts in addition of the knowledge of the “widespread
or systematic attack”(159) against the civilian population. Instead, with
respect to genocide, one has to determine the quintessential “special
intent” (dolus specialis) to “destroy in whole or in part” one of the targeted
groups, in addition to the “general intent” underpinning the killing or any
other of the material acts encompassed by the definition of the crime of
genocide. As the ICTR stated in its landmark case:
“Genocide is distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a
special intent or dolus specialis. Special intent of a crime is the
specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime,
which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act
charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in ‘the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such’”(160)
For instance, persecution represents by all means a CAH if discrimination is
carried out in widespread scale. Under the scenario of genocide, discrimination
is required too, but one has also to determine the “special intent” to destroy in
whole or in part the group”. In a nutshell, one might resume the major
differences between crime of genocide and CAH from the standpoint of mens
rea, with two simple words: quantity vs quality. The former underlies the CAH
(widespread and systematic attack) and normally requires huge numbers whilst
the latter features the crime of genocide which focus on the contrary on the
“special intent” enabling thus to distinguish a mere killing from genocide
through killing if performed with the aim of destroying the group to which the
victim belongs. In other words, special intent required by PIL for a crime of
is characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result and the
mental state of the perpetrator”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998,
para. 518. Likewise: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic, 2003, para. 520.
(159) The element of “plan” which may prove the systematic character of a CAH must
not be mistaken with the “special intent” required for the crime of genocide, even
though the two concepts may share some commonalities: “although a specific plan to
destroy does not constitute an element of genocide, it would appear that it is not easy
to carry out a genocide without a plan or organization”, ICTR, The Prosecutor v.
Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, para. 94.
(160) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998, para. 498.
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genocide to be committed may palliate the huge numbers (widespread)
needed for the commission of a CAH.(161)
Lastly, in the case of a simultaneous perpetration of a crime of genocide
and a CAH – for the same material act – then the former encompasses and
absorbs the latter,(162) hence revealing its graver nature compared to the
CAH, since it shows a special (thus aggravated) intent to destroy in whole or
in part a protected group. In this connection, and on the account of the
focus placed by the crime of genocide on quality instead of quantity, it is not
worthless to address the question whether a genocide might perpetrated by
a single individual, a rare hypothesis that cannot be yet excluded at least
from a conceptual standpoint.(163) In the Genocide case, the World Court
tackles indirectly this crucible question in connection with the germane
issue of determining the “ ‘part’ of the ‘group’ for the purposes of Article II”
of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention. The ICJ considers then that both the
“substantiality requirement” (i.e., the victims’ toll) and the “qualitative
approach”(164) cannot “stand alone” and hence they concur jointly to verify
the conditions set out by Article II of the UN 1948 Genocide Convention.

(161) “This Trial Chamber emphasises that in view of the requirement of a surplus of
intent, it is not necessary to prove a de facto destruction of the group and therefore
concludes that it is not necessary to establish, with the assistance of a demographer,
the size of the victimised population in numerical terms. It is the genocidal dolus
specialis that predominantly constitutes the crime”, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Stakic,
2003, para. 522.
(162) ICTR, The Prosecutor v. Kyieshima and Ruzindana, 1999, paras. 628 ff.
(163) ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Jelisic, 1999, paras. 100-101. In the case in point, the
Tribunal, while admitting in asbtracto such hypothesis – provided that the single killing
took place within and in accordance with a plan (i.e. a genocidal policy) –, established
that the accused randomly killed the victim and not in the pursuance of a plan, thence
the lack of “special intent”. Indeed, later on the Tribunal made clear that “The Trial
Chamber observes, however, that it will be very difficult in practice to provide proof of
the genocidal intent of an individual if the crimes committed are not widespread and if
the crime charged is not backed by an organisation or a system”. It is hard to not agree
with this finding.
(164) I.e. : “If a specific part of the group is emblematic of the overall group leaders?,
or is essential to its survival women?, that may support a finding that the part
qualifies as substantial within the meaning of Article 4 (of the ICTY Statute which
exactly reproduces Article II of the Convention”, ICJ’s quoting ICTY case (The
Prosecutor v. Krstic, 2004, para. 12), para. 200.
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Furthermore, in the Akayesu case, ICTR makes the finding according to
which a single victim is sufficient to substantiate genocide if the intent to
destroy partially or entirely the group in point is proved. However, the
Tribunal seems to override the literal interpretation of its Statute (which
mentions “killing members of the group”, i.e. plural)(165) for the benefit of
the teleological means of interpretation.(166)

Synoptic Table of International Crimes

Nurnberg
Tribunal(167)
1948 Convention(169)
I.C.T.Y. Statute(170)
I.C.T.R. Statute(171)
Rome Statute
(ICC)(172)

Genocide Crime against
Humanity
(168)
------Art. 6 litt. c)
Art. 2
Art. 4
Art. 2
Art. 6

Art. 5
Art. 3
Art. 7

War Crimes

Crime against Peace

Art. 6 litt. b)

Art. 6 litt. a)

Art. 3
Art. 4
Art. 8

----------Art. 8 bis (173)

(165) Article 2 (2) a) ICTR Statute.
(166) Both find their place in the toolbox of interpretation of international treaties. See
infra VII.2.4.5.2.
Nurnberg
International
Military
Tribunal
(8
August
1945):
(167)
http://www.icrc.org/dih.
(168) It was at that time subsumed under the heading “crime against of humanity”, as
one of its illustrative components.
(169) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (9
December 1948). An authoritative commentary of this fundamental multilateral
convention may be found in: The UN Genocide Convention – A Commentary, ed. by P.
Gaeta, Oxford, 2009.
(170) UNSC Res. 827 (25 May 1993).
(171) UNSC Res. 955 (8 November 1994).
(172)http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Legal+Texts+and+Tools/Official+Journal/Rome+Statute. Htm. An
authoritative commentary of the cornerstone of contemporary international criminal
law can be found in: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, ed. by A.
Cassese, P. Gaeta and J.R.W.D. Jones, Oxford, 2002.
(173) Art. 5 § of the 1998 Rome Statute provides that: “The Court shall exercise
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance
with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision
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III. Procedural Law: The Repression of International Crimes
Quite intuitively PIL, as a province of Law, is made up of substantive and
institutional norms; criminal international law makes of course no
exception. Indeed, PIL has established domestic and international repression
mechanisms for the violation of individual’s conducts which are qualified as
international crimes. It consists of the aforementioned trilogy of
international crimes expressed by the IMT Statute (war crimes, crimes
against peace and crimes against humanity) and the crime of genocide
(emancipated from this latter category to attain its own autonomy).
As in other provinces of PIL, the guarantee of international criminal
norms is carried out both on the international and on the municipal plane.
The following subsections will deal respectively with both of them.
III.1. The Domestic Implementation of International Criminal
Responsibility
From an historical standpoint, domestic punishment has emerged as the
first means of sanction of international crimes and for quite a long-time,
despite several attempts in Modern History, has remained the sole
mechanism permitting the enforcement of this province of PIL. This
historical fact is the outcome of the weak institutionalization of the
international legal order especially in this field. Failing an international, or at
very least of a multinational tribunal, international punishment could hardly
be envisaged. (174) Therefore, it was, and it can be argued that it is still
roughly the same nowadays, up to States to proceed to crime repression,
through the means of domestic judiciary mechanisms, and according to the
shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations”.
During the review session of the Assembly of the State Parties (13th meeting, Kampala,
11 June 2010), the crime of aggression was finally defined and inserted within the ICC
jurisdiction (res. 6) under the heading of Art. 8 bis. See supra note 65.
(174) S. Glaser, Infraction internationale, ses elements constitutifs et ses aspects
juridiques, Paris, 1957, p. 31: “Les infractions internationales sont soumises, aussi
longtemps qu’une jurisdiction criminelle internationale n’existe pas au régime de la
répression ou de la compétence universelle. Dans ce régime, les auteurs de pareilles
infractions peuvent être poursuivis et punis en quelque pays que ce soit, donc sans
égard au lieu où l’infraction a été commise: Ubi te invenero, ibi te judicabo”. This
excerpt has been quoted verbatim by the District Court of Jerusalem (Israel) in the
Eichmann case (April-December 1961).
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usual criteria of jurisdiction: a) ratione loci (or territorial criterion), the
location where the crime was committed);(175) b) ratione personae (or
personal criterion), which can be two-fold, both the nationality of the author
of the crime and that of the victim of the crime.
These three nexuses which allow linking the crime to State jurisdiction
and ultimately the punishment, are provided for in States’ criminal code
allowing them to prosecute and eventually punish the authors of the crime.
Of course, as it happens in other criminal domains others than that of
international crimes, several States may entertain jurisdiction over a single
criminal act: a) the State over whose territory the crime has been
committed; b) the State of nationality of the author of the criminal act; c) as
well as the State of nationality of the victim of the criminal act.
Alongside, with these jurisdictional criteria, PIL has established through
either international treaties and customary international law what is called
the universality principle or universal jurisdiction. According to this deeprotted procedural principle, any State can bring before justice the alleged
criminal independently of his/her nationality, the victims’ nationality or
where the crime was committed – as it occurred in the Pinochet case).(176)
Indeed, the Nuremberg trilogy (plus genocide) created obligations for
States: they must adopt this typology of crimes in their domestic legal order
as well as allow the jurisdictional application in their own domestic legal
order. This translates into universal competence, or universality of
jurisdiction. However, the path leading to such universal jurisdiction went
had to go through the exclusiveness of jurisdiction of the territorial State
and that respectively of the offender’s and victim’s. As for the genocide, for
(175) Article 6 of the 1948 Genocide Convention; in this regard the ICJ pointed out
that: “Article VI only obliges the Contracting Parties to institute and exercise territorial
criminal jurisdiction; while it certainly does not prohibit States, with respect to
genocide, from conferring jurisdiction on their criminal courts based on criteria other
than where the crime was committed which are compatible with international law, in
particular the nationality of the accused, it does not oblige them to do so”, Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), cit. (2007), § 442 (at 226-227).
(176) The criminal proceedings against were eventually dismissed and charges
dropped since the offences in question occurred before the entry into force of the
Convention against torture vis-à-vis UK which was requested by Spain to extradite
Pinochet (former head of State of Chile).
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instance, Article 6 of the 1948 Convention provides for the domestic
criminal repression, i.e. that of the State on the territory of which the crime
was perpetrated (locus commissi delicti).(177) This same article then goes on
by establishing a parallel international criminal repression via an
international jurisdiction to be created – the “International Penal Tribunal” –
which will never actually materialise.(178) No special obligation in matters of
extradition was introduced, aside from a mere statement to the point of
referring to existing relevant treaties.(179) In fact, the rule establishing
universal jurisdiction in matter of genocide emerged outside the Convention
itself so that ultimately the latter was accordingly modified.
Flowing from the principle of universal jurisdiction (an entitlement rule) is
the aut dedere aut iudicare principle (a prescriptive rule), i.e. a State is
bound to transfer an accused to another State willing and being able to
prosecute the suspect(180) and thus to ignite the appropriate judicial
proceedings,(181) if it not able or not willing do it itself. Moreover, States are
bound to take all necessary means in order to prevent the punishable
violations.(182) These alternative obligations allow States to coordinate their
(177) Literally: the place where the criminal offense has been committed.
(178) However, by virtue of a dynamic interpretation (of the 1948 Convention) the ICJ
felt rightly confident to say that “co-operation with the ICTY constitutes an obligation
stemming from(i.a.) … an obligation arising from its status as a party to the Genocide
Convention” (Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), cit. (2007), §
442 (at 228], notwithstanding thus the letter of the Convention itself which nowhere
explicitly provides for such cooperation. Indeed, as it will be shown later on, dynamic
interpretation represents a powerful tool for normative change in PIL.
(179) Article 7 of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.
(180) “Although Senegal is not required under the Convention to institute proceedings
concerning acts that were committed before 26 June 1987, nothing in that instrument
prevents it from doing so”, ICJ, Questions related to the Obligation to Prosecute or
Extradite, 2012 § 102.
(181) As the World Court recently held regarding the Convention against torture,
(whose article 7 (1) provides for the these two obligations), the State concerned must
abide by them “within a reasonable time” and “without delay”, even though the
aforementioned convention does not set a precise time frame (ICJ, Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite, cit., §§ 114-115). By analogy, it can be inferred that such a
temporal requirement is equally applicable under current general international law.
(182) “It follows that the rights and obligations enshrined by the Convention are rights
and obligations erga omnes. The Court notes that the obligation each State thus has to
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concurrent domestic jurisdictions. From this perspective, and despite the
fact that most obligations are international, repression is articulated in the
national sphere of the State. Several examples of national punishment can
be cited in this respect: Eichmann, Barbie, Papon, Priebke, Kappler, etc.
A few words must be spent with regard to the immunity an organ (183) of a
State might enjoy before municipal tribunal prosecuting him or her for any
of the aforementioned international crimes, when he (or she) is still in
office.(184) In a case brought before it, the World Court asserted such
immunity, though with a clear dismay from some authorities of PIL. The
Court affirmed that:
“in international law it is firmly established that, as also diplomatic
and consular agents, certain holders high-ranking office in a State,
such as the Head of State, Head of Government and Minister for
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States,
both civil and criminal”(185)
In sum, as long as one of these State’s organs holds is in office, he (or she)
cannot be prosecuted by another State’s municipal tribunal in accordance
with the principle of sovereign equality of States (Article 2 (1) UNC) and its
procedural corollary, i.e. “par in parem non habet iurisdictionem” (No
prevent and to punish the crime of genocide is not territorially limited by the
Convention”, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 1996, § 31, p.
616; ICJ, Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 § 157 (at 199).
(183) With regard to State’s and State organs immunities, see: G. Distefano, 2019 pp.
122-133.
(184) Indeed, it ought to be made clear that immunity is an exception to the principle
recognizing a State to wield its criminal jurisdiction (and this is all the more true in the
context of international crimes). As the ECHR adamantly affirmed a State organ cannot
“plead immunity in respect of gross human rights violations”, such as torture or
inhuman and degrading treatments (ECHR, Al-Adsani v. UK, Application n° 35763/97,
Judgement of 21 November 2001 (Grand Chamber), § 24).
(185) ICJ, Arrest Warrant, para. 51 (pp. 21-22). The Court is referring to the so-called
“Troika” of a State in PIL (according to Article 7 § 2 (a) VCLT 1969, Head of State, Head
of Government, Minister of Foreign Affairs), see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 408-410. The
Court – by analogy with article 29 VCDR stating the inviolability of a diplomatic agent –
reiterated in a later case the uncontroversial existence of “international obligations
regarding the immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of foreign Heads
of States”, ICJ, Questions of Mutual Assistance, 2008, para. 173 (p. 238).
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dominium between equals). In recognizing this immunity, PIL hence seems
to make no distinction between ordinary crimes committed by one of State
organs (Rainbow Warrior) and major international crimes. The Court
hastened, though, to add that
“the immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for
Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of
any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal
responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional
immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question
of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution
for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the
person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility”(186)
In brief, prosecution by its own State or by any other State may be
triggered when he (or she) will be no more in office (as it was rightly
pretended with regard to Pinochet, for example); in this case immunity has
ceased and cannot shield any more the beneficiary from a criminal
proceedings.(187)
More importantly, yet, an organ of State in office may be prosecuted, as
it will be dealt with later on, by a competent international tribunal, before
which, since the Nuremberg Trials, no such immunity may be invoked to
dodge international punishment:
“An incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may be
subject to criminal proceedings before certain international criminal
courts, where they have jurisdiction”(188)
Indeed, the principle of sovereign equality can no more be referred to
build up a shield, since the jurisdiction is not wielded by a State but by the
International Community through a treaty so empowered either by a treaty,
either directly (such as the ICC) or indirectly (such UNCS established ad hoc
international criminal tribunals). In both cases, States concerned have
(186) Ibid., para. 60 (p. 26).
(187) “After a person ceases to hold the office of Minister for Foreign Affairs, he or
she will no longer enjoy all of the immunities accorded by international law in other
States, loc.cit.
(188) Ibid., para. 61(p. 26).
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discarded the rule of immunity recognized to their incumbent organs with a
view to permit the exercise of international criminal jurisdiction.(189)
Finally, in the light of individual’s asserted international personality,
domestic repression must be distinguished from international repression, as
it takes place within the States’ legal order and as such has no influence on
the individual’s status. Thus, we cannot speak in terms of international
subjectivity of the individual, when the repression is carried out in the
domestic sphere before national courts.
III.2.
The International Implementation of International
Criminal Responsibility
III.2.1. The Two Ad hoc International Tribunals: ICTY and ICTR
In the cases set under international instruments establishing repression
mechanisms at the international level, the individual can be subjected to an
international criminal trial.(190). Such a system was shaped by Article VII of
the Convention for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide
1948 – which provided for the creation of an “International Penal Tribunal”
– but was never materialized.(191)
Technically speaking in fact, and taking into account its genesis and its
context, IMT of Nuremberg was not a genuine international (criminal)
tribunal, but more accurately a multinational tribunal created by the
victorious States against Nazi Germany with a view to prosecuting and

(189) See infra III.2.3.2.
(190) For example, see Art. 9 of the ICTY Statutes as well as Art. 1 combined with Art.
17 of the ICC Statute which establishes the complementarity jurisdiction of the ICC in
cases of non or lacking functioning of the Member States’ national criminal
jurisdictions.
(191) As a matter of fact, by this same resolution adopting the Genocide Convention,
UNGA “invited” in its Part B “the International Law Commission to study the
desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of
persons charged with genocide or other crimes over which jurisdiction will be
conferred upon that organ by international conventions”, Resolution 260 (III) of 9
December 1948. As it will be shown further on, for the purposes of application of the
1948 UN Genocide Convention, one might consider ICC as being the “international
penal tribunal” referred to in its Article VI.
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punishing major war criminals of the defeated State.(192) The four Allies
indeed drew their power from their status of occupying powers under IHL.
They thus administered criminal justice through the application of PIL which
was of course applicable to Germany and over German territory (and State
organs) as the “Law of the Land”.
That’s why it is more correct to trace back the first true international
tribunals to those created by the UNSC respectively in 1993 and 1994 with
regard to former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In fact, the two conflicts, yet
different in their legal nature and characteristics, awoke the legal
conscience(193) of the international community through the action of the
UNSC in the field of collective security.(194) After quite a few
procrastinations, the UN organ vested with the “principal responsibility” for
the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security
decided to create first the ICTY – 1993 – and then ICTR – in 1994 -, that is to
say two international criminal tribunals empowered to prosecute individuals
having committed international crimes during these two conflicts.
It was in effect the first time that an ad hoc international criminal tribunal
had been established by a unilateral act of an organ of an IO. With regard to
the situation in former Yugoslavia, the response from international
community has not spared criticisms both for its delayed and its insufficient
character. That’s why quite a few commentators saw in the creation of the
ICTY a fig-leaf concocted with a view to saving the face of the UN and the
international community at large. It was then hoped that its establishment
had not only a retrospective effect – through the punishment – but also a
deterrent effect over those potential authors of future criminal acts, since
the conflict was still raging. The creation of the tribunal via the UNSC (195) was
(192) The adjectival difference between international and multinational resonates
mutatis mutandis as that regarding collective security between international forces
and multinational forces.
(193) On the exact meaning of this oft-abused formula, seeG. Distefano, 2019, pp. 559564..
(194) See: ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, 1995, para. 32..
(195) In accordance with the UNC, all UN main bodies are endowed with the power to
create subsidiary organs if necessary for the accomplishment of their mandate (Article
7 (2) UNC). However, the establishment was challenged – and this contention duly
rebutted – in the first case brought before the ICTY: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
1995, paras. 26-48.
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the fruit of a joint proposal stemming from France, Germany and USA and
was eventually preferred to the other solution consisting in its creation
through the conclusion of international treaty, which would have required a
much longer time to enter into force and thus for the tribunal to
operate.(196)
In both cases, UNSC resorted to the establishment of these two
tribunals(197) after having duly determined that the UN was faced to a
“threat of peace” thus allowing it to avail itself of coercive measures
envisaged in UNC Chapter VII. The “threat of peace”, one of the three
situations likely to trigger UNSC’s powers under this chapter, consisted, in
the two cases in point, of : mass murders, acts of genocide, widespread and
systematic violations of HR, ethnic cleansings, violations of “laws and
customs of war”, etc.(198)
Hence, by adopting its resolution 827 UNCS established ICTY and
accordingly requested all Member States to fully cooperate with the tribunal
for the purposes of prosecuting and punishing the authors of acts of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (Articles 2 to 5 of the
ICTY Statute, annexed to the aforementioned resolution). A year later, (199)
UNSC adopted resolution 955 thereby establishing ICTR entrusted with the

(196) It ought to be noted that whilst an external committee of internationally
renowned jurists was entrusted with the task of drafting the ICTY Statute, the ICTR
Statute was framed “in-house” through the recourse of the UN legal affairs
department.
(197) Statute of the international Court to judge the individuals allegedly responsible
of grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, SC Resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, ICTR Statute,
SC Resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994. The last version of the text of the
Statutes are available on the respective websites of these courts: http://www.icty.org
and http://www.ictr.org
(198) With regard to the pregnant formula “threat to peace”, see: A.L. Graf-Brugère, La
“menace contre la paix” dans la pratique du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies.
Réflexions sur un concept de droit international, Geneva, 2019.
(199) UN rightly decided to act in the same way in the African continent, as it had
previously done with regard to the situation in former Yugoslavia, lest international
community might have thought of a double standard of action. Furthermore, the new
Rwandan government, which seized power after the civil war, asked the UNSC to act
likewise.
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mandate of prosecuting and punishing the authors of genocide, (200) crimes
against humanity and of violations of common Article 3 to the four GE 1949
and their P/II 1977 (Articles 2 to 4 of the ICTR Statute). (201) The
aforementioned provisions aimed thus at defining both tribunals’
jurisdiction ratione materiae.
Ratione loci, i.e. territorial jurisdiction, encompassed, as far as ICTY is
concerned, all criminal facts occurred on the territory of former Yugoslavia,
whilst ICTR’s was confined to the territory of the Rwandan State. However,
with the regard to the latter, the Tribunal may entertain any claim based on
criminal acts perpetrated by Rwandan nationals on neighbour States’
territories (the territorial extension of the ICTR’s jurisdiction is hence limited
having regard to its goal, i.e. the punishment of criminal acts perpetrated
during the civil war in Rwanda, notably, yet not exclusively, genocide).
Ratione temporis, i.e. temporal jurisdiction, ICTR’s jurisdiction is clearly
determined: all criminal acts committed between January 1 st and December
31st, 1994. The temporal dimension of ICTY is instead a bit more complex,
insofar while the dies a quo (the commencement) has been fixed at January
1st, 1991 (in accordance with Article 8 of the ICTY Statute and paragraph of
the UNSC resolution 827), the setting of dies ad quem (the end) was left for
a further determination by the UNSC “upon the restoration of peace” in
former Yugoslavia’s territories.(202)
A crucible aspect related to the exercise by the two ad hoc tribunals of
their jurisdiction was related to the concurrence of domestic jurisdiction
with domestic courts of States, precisely by virtue of the principle of
universal jurisdiction. By virtue of Articles 9 ICTY and 8 ICTR Statutes – which
affirm the concurrence of jurisdiction (paragraph 1) –, both tribunals “shall

(200) In both ad hoc tribunals, ratione personae jurisdiction was limited to physical
persons and was not extended, contrariwise to the IMT’s, to legal corporations.
(201) Contrariwise to the conflict which was eventually qualified as a IAC, thus allowing
for the application of the four 1949 GE and their P/I 1977, the conflict in Rwanda –
which feature by the way a strong genocide character both in its roots and its further
developments – was a NIAC; hence, only claims based on the infringements to
common Article 3 of the four 1949 GE and their P/II 1997 could be entertained by the
ICTR. In both cases, ad hoc tribunals Statutes were annexed to the respective UNSC
resolutions purporting to their creation.
(202) ICTY, In re The Republic of Macedonia I, Trial Chamber, October 4, 2002.

90

https://scholarworks.uaeu.ac.ae/sharia_and_law/vol2021/iss85/10

] [Year 35, Issue No. 85 January 2021]

56

Distefano: ????????? ???????? ??????? ?????: ???? ????? ???????? ???????

[Prof. Giovanni Distefano]

nonetheless have the primacy over the national courts of all States. At any
stage of the procedure, the … Tribunal … may formally request national
courts to defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence”. Hence, the two international
criminal tribunals have been endowed by the UNSC, by virtue of its powers
under Chapter VII alongside with Article 103 of the UNC, (203) with a true
primacy over municipal courts. By way of consequence, in accordance to the
principle “ne bis in idem”,(204) the latter cannot re-trial an individual who has
already been tried – for the same acts – by the ICTY or ICTR; instead, a
individual may be re-tried by ICTY or ICTR, but:
“only if: (a) The act for which he or she was tried was characterised as an
ordinary crime; or (b) The national court proceedings were not impartial
or independent, were designed to shield the accused from international
criminal responsibility, or the case was not diligently prosecuted” (205)
The principle of primacy of the two international criminal tribunals
pursues also the aim of ensuring that States truly cooperate with the
requests issued by them, such as ; information, witness and of course the
referral of suspects. Further, UN did not entertain a profound trust of the
fairness of justice delivered by municipal courts in the States concerned, i.e.
States belonging to former Yugoslavia.(206)
In 2003, UNSC adopted resolution 1503 whose paragraph states the
following: “Calls on the ICTY and the ICTR to take all possible measures to
complete investigations by the end of 2004 (date at which the final
indictments were accordingly issued), to complete all trial activities at first
instance by the end of 2008, and to complete all work in 2010 (the
Completion Strategies)”.(207) However, UNSC couldn’t fail to note that this

(203) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 262-265.
(204) See: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 575-577.
(205) Article 2 (1) ICTR Statute; Article 10 (2) ICTY Statute has an identical content.
(206) It was in effect fretted that, in order to defeat any incrimination from the
international tribunal concerned, the accused could be tried by a benevolent municipal
jurisdiction; the opposite phenomenon had also to be averted, i.e. a suspect tried by a
malevolent jurisdiction. In both cases, there was a true danger of an unfair trial.
(207) Further, according to UNSC resolution 1534 (2004), “assessments on the
progress made towards implementation of the completion strategy of the Tribunal”
are to be submitted to the UNSC every six months.
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strategy did not fully work and in 2010 it adopted resolution 1966 according
to which it:
“Decides to establish the International Residual Mechanism for
Criminal Tribunals (“the Mechanism”) with two branches, which shall
commence functioning on 1 July 2012 (branch for the ICTR) and 1 July
2013 (branch for the ICTY), respectively (“commencement dates”),
and to this end decides to adopt the Statute of the Mechanism in
Annex 1 to this resolution;”(208)
Hence, in accordance with this resolution, ICTY and ICTR have henceforth
merged(209) in a single institution deemed to complete its works within the
following timelines: a) with regard to the ICTY, 4 years after July 1 st, 2013; b)
with regard to the ICTR, 4 years after July 1st, 2012. After these dates, the
Mechanism continues to operate as a stand-alone institution. At the same
time “lower- or intermediate-rank accused to the Chamber” were to be
referred to a special chamber established to this effect, in order to relieve
the burden of the Mechanism.
A few years after the end of functioning of these two tribunals, it is not
unworthy to briefly take stock of their works and impact on PIL. On the asset
side, it is beyond any doubt that both tribunals have helped crystallised,
strengthened and developed the substantive body of international criminal
law. It is hence not too bold to affirm that thanks to their jurisprudence,
this, until then quite less-developed, field of PIL has undergone a dramatic
(208) As acknowledged by this same resolution itself, “administrative and budgetary
aspects” linked to the functioning of both international criminal tribunals played a role
in the establishment of this “Mechanism”, deemed to accelerate the trials and
streamline the two institutions. Another key means aimed at accelerating the
completion of the ICTY’s works was the “establishment under the auspices of the High
Representative and early functioning of a special chamber within the State Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (the “War Crimes Chamber”) and the subsequent referral by
the ICTY of cases of lower- or intermediate-rank accused to the Chamber,” (ibid., 11th
preambulary section). Since then, UNSC review the progress of the work of the
Mechanism every two years.
(209) It is interesting to observe that while this merger was decided in order to
expedite the works of the two ad hoc tribunals, an opposite decision was taken with,
though, the same aim. In 2003, UNSC decided to appoint a separate chief prosecutor
for the ICTR, which was until then and since the beginning the same as ICTY’s
(paragraph 8 and Annex I to UNSC resolution 1503).
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expansion. Furthermore, the two tribunals’ jurisprudence has spilled over on
another province of PIL, i.e. IHL which has greatly benefited not only,
obviously, with regard to war crimes but also in respect of CAH. One may
even put forward that the henceforth these two provinces of PIL have
nourished mutually and have tightened their ties between them. On a more
practical note, one has to observe that all the suspects have been eventually
brought before the two tribunals; that’s far from being a minor victory
taking into account the flaws of municipal criminal courts of the States
concerned and the fact that it was only in 2002 that a permanent
international criminal jurisdiction was established. In a different, yet non unrelated, register, this these two ad hoc tribunals have contributed, to
varying extent, to the reconciliation between the populations scarred by
these terrible conflicts. They have hence enabled the punishment of the
most heinous international crimes and might in the long-term serve as a
deterrent for future crimes elsewhere in the world. Finally, one does not
have to underscore the impact, again in the long-term, of the judicial truth –
determined by the two tribunals – on the historical narrative. It is then
today too early to assess the actual legacy of these two international ad hoc
tribunals.
On the negative side, it has been contended, quite rightly in fact, the high
functioning cost of the two tribunals; as it has been earlier observed, this
was one of the reasons leading to the implementation of the “completion
strategy”. On a more technical key, it was harshly criticized the impossibility
for both tribunals to render a judgement in absentia as well as for the civil
parties to appear before the tribunals other than as simple witnesses. On a
conceptual registry, it has been asserted, more or less rightly, that the mere
existence of an international criminal tribunal might have induced States not
to prosecute internally these crimes. On a germane plane, it was noted, too,
that a two-speed criminal justice has popped up on the account of these
two ad hoc tribunals for the same crimes whether their authors are
prosecuted before them or before municipal courts: a) capital punishment,
contrariwise to many domestic criminal legislations, could not be inflicted by
the two international tribunals; b) conditions of imprisonment are generally
far better in the Netherlands (or in another country willing to accept
offender in their gaols) than elsewhere in the world; c) judicial guarantees
offered by the international process are far better too since they meet all
the stringent international UN standards. On a different note, some States
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and scholars alike have voiced criticism in regard of the jurisprudence of the
two international tribunals; critiques range from its excessive development
(de lege ferenda) not always genuinely mirroring current state of customary
international law, to its technical inaccuracies, especially in matter of IHL.
Finally, and the present author may share the perplexities of this last strand
of criticism, it has been held that justice, all the more criminal justice,
rendered far away from the site of the crime might have less impact on the
human society concerned, thus voiding one of the aims of criminal justice,
i.e. the satisfaction of the victims as well as its deterrent function related
hereto.
III.2.2. Hybrid Criminal Tribunals or the (varying)
Internationalization of Municipal Criminal Justice
Before delving into the ICC, one has to note that another category of
criminal jurisdictions has seen the light in the wake of the establishment of
the two ad hoc tribunals by the UNSC, that is to say the so-called “mixed” or
“internationalised” criminal tribunals. Having in mind the limited and
specific purpose of this contribution, we will but briefly dwell on them. Of
course, the hybrid character (between domestic and international
dimension) is highly variable among them; hence, following the criterion of
the increasing internationalization of the administration of criminal justice,
one shall have to cite in the first place the system established (indirectly) by
UNSC resolution 1244 in Kosovo, which provided for a “civil section” within
the UN peace-keeping forces, the MINUK. The possibility was thus left open
to appoint a foreign judge – sitting in the bench of municipal courts – in
order to shatter the image of an unfair domestic criminal system. This
solution is in effect the closest possible to an exclusive domestically
rendering of criminal justice, yet with a light touch of internationalisation.
The second case is represented by East-Timor, where the UNSC had sent
a peace-keeping force – INTERFET (“International Force for East Timor”) –
with the aim of accompanying the Timorese people to the independence,
after its struggle against unlawful and illegal Indonesian occupation
(following decolonization from Portugal). Due to the sheer absence of
judiciary, UN decided to establish a tribunal in Dili entrusted with the task of
trying international crimes. In view of managing this newly founded judicial
system, the UNTAET (“United Nations Transitional Administration in East
Timor”), carried out the function of training local judges. In addition, to the
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(international) training, international jurists have been appointed by the
UNTAET to sit on the bench so that at the end a mix of domestic and
international judges made up the new judiciary the mandate of which is to
try authors of international crimes during the war of national liberation
against Indonesia. As far as applicable law is concerned, it is noteworthy to
observe that failing a proper municipal code envisaging international crimes,
UN has framed the required substantive and procedural law to this effect.
The three major crimes (bar then the crime against peace) are defined in the
same manner as in the 1998 Rome Statute, which is thus considered as a
genuine mirror of customary international law in this matter as it existed
(already) during the war of national liberation against Indonesia. However,
the system has not been hitherto noticeably brilliant.
The third – and hitherto the last in time – example of a hybrid criminal
tribunal is that of Lebanon. On December 13th, 2005, the Government of
Lebanon requested to the UN to establish a tribunal – having thus an
international character – entrusted with the task to try the authors of the
attack leading to the killing of Mr. Rafic Hariri, former Lebanon’s PM, as
wells as of 22 other peoples. In accordance to UNSC resolution 1664 (2006),
UN and the Government of Lebanon have negotiated an international
agreement aiming at the establishment of the future “Special Tribunal for
Lebanon” (STL). Hence, following UNSC resolution 1757 (2007), the
provisions contained in the document annexed thereto – regarding the
creation and the Statute of the STL – entered into force on June 10, 2007,
thus leading to the actual creation of the STL. As specified earlier, the
mandate of the Tribunal is to try the authors of a bomb attack having led to
the death of Mr. Rafic Hariri and other 22 persons; having regard to the
complex religious dimensions and the intricacies – both social and political –
inherited from a lengthy civil war (including more than a couple of foreign
unlawful invasions from Israel and Syria), the set up of a “mixed” tribunal
deemed to establish the judicial truth over the violent death of a leading
Lebanon political figure, was considered the best if not the only available
solution to this effect. For these same reason, it was decided that the seat of
the tribunal “shall have its seat outside Lebanon” (Article 1 of the Annex to
UNSC resolution 1757) and was eventually based at The Hague. STL’s
jurisdiction might extend even before and after the aforementioned attack
(i.e. between October 1st, 2004 and December 12th, 2005), if it determines
that other terrorist attacks occurred in Lebanon have had, according to well-

[College of Law UAE University]

Published by Scholarworks@UAEU, 2021

95

61

Journal Sharia and Law, Vol. 2021, No. 85 [2021], Art. 10

[International Criminal Responsibility of the Individual: A Quantum Leap for Man’s Humanity]

founded general principles of criminal law, a nexus with the terrorist attack
of February 14, 2005 and provided that they present a similar gravity and
nature. The nexus in point may include, without being limited to: “a
combination of the following elements: criminal intent (motive), the
purpose behind the attacks, the nature of the victims targeted, the pattern
of the attacks (modus operandi) and the perpetrators” (Article 1 of the
Annex to UNSC resolution 1757). With regard to the structure of the STL, it is
made up of a Prosecutor, a Registry, a Defence office and of course of three
Chambers: pre-trial (one international judge), trial (one Lebanese and two
international judges) and an appeals chamber (two Lebanese and three
international judges). Hence, the international character, which is clearly
mirrored in the composition of the STL, is not though found in the applicable
law, insofar the Tribunal may only apply, according to Article 2 of its Statute
(annexed to UNSC resolution 1757), Lebanese law and more precisely: “a)
provisions of the Lebanese Criminal Code relating to the prosecution and
punishment of acts of terrorism, crimes and offences against life and
personal integrity, illicit associations and failure to report crimes and
offences, including the rules regarding the material elements of a crime,
criminal participation and conspiracy; and (b) Articles 6 and 7 of the
Lebanese law of 11 January 1958 on “Increasing the penalties for sedition,
civil war and interfaith struggle”.”. However, late STL President Prof. Cassese
demonstrated in a widely resonating decision that there exists a customary
(general) definition of terrorism; hence, since customary international law
applies to (and within) every State, then this definition is an integral part of
Lebanese law. According to Professor Cassese, the international crime of
terrorism possesses:
“the following three key elements: (i) the perpetration of a criminal
act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, arson, and so on), or
threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the
population (which would generally entail the creation of public
danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or international
authority to take some action, or to refrain from taking it; (iii) when
the act involves a transnational element.”(210)

(210) STL, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy,
Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, Case No. STL-11-01/I (February 16,
2011), para. 85.
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This conceptualization of the crime of terrorism as well as the very
determination of its existence in customary international law has raised
some criticism from a few scholars. Yet, and the present author profoundly
share the finding of late Professor Cassese, this decision remains one of the
most potent legacies of this distinguished jurist and, as far STL is concerned,
it surely permitted the tribunal to avoid the dire consequences of lack of
definition in PIL and thus within Lebanese Law. Finally, as the very STL
website prides itself to underscore, the Tribunal, notwithstanding its
tormented genesis (in fact quite similar to all the other hybrid tribunals) and
functioning(211), presents some “unique features”: a) the existence of an
autonomous pre-trial chamber; b) the existence of a Defence offices as an
integral part of the STL itself; c) the possibility of in absentia trials; d) the
participation of the victims to the proceedings (without though having the
right to seek compensation before it); e) a true terrorism trial.
A fourth example is that of “Extraordinary Chambers in the Court of
Cambodia” mandated to deal with the Cambodian genocide occurred during
the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-1979) until the Vietnamese invasion of this
country.(212) Since Hun Sen’s rise to power in 1993 as Prime Minister, he
endeavoured to establish a judicial system with a view to trying the crimes
committed during this period; however, this purely domestic attempt faced
manifold difficulties and eventually aborted. The solution was then found
out through cooperation with the UN and an agreement was finally
concluded on June 6, 2003 between the latter and the Cambodian
Government (“Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia concerning the prosecution under Cambodian law
of crimes committed during the period of Democratic Kampuchea”) which
led to the establishment of “extraordinary chambers” entrusted with the
task of trying were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of
Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and
international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed
during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979” (Article 1). The
Chambers consisted of a Trial Chamber – composed by three Cambodian
(211) Not to mention the early demise of its President, the world-renowned Law
Professor Antonio Cassese.
(212) Initially, the Vietnamese tribunals had sentenced to death Khmer Rouge’s leader
Pol Pot (and some of his acolytes), but the Vietnamese reverted finally to a general
amnesty in order to find an agreement with the new Cambodian rulers.
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judges and two international judges – and of Supreme Court Chamber –
made up of four Cambodian judges and three international judges (Article
3). It appears evident that in each of the two degrees of jurisdiction there is
(decisive) majority of Cambodian judges. Applicable law is not referred to in
this agreement, but it is instead mentioned in a domestic law to be adopted
by Cambodia. The bill in question (promulgated in 2004 not without a
subsequent amendment) provides that the crimes falling within the
compass of the “extraordinary chambers” are the following: a) homicide,
torture, religious persecution as defined in Cambodian Penal Code (Article 3
new); b) genocide (Article 4 makes an explicit renvoi to the 1948 UN
Genocide convention); c) CAH (Article 5);(213) d) “grave breaches” of the four
1949 GE (Article 6);(214) e) “the destruction of cultural property during
armed conflict pursuant to the 1954 Hague Convention for Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict” (Article 7); f) “crimes
against internationally protected persons pursuant to the Vienna
Convention of 1961 on Diplomatic Relations” (Article 8). Jurisdiction ratione
personae was unsurprisingly limited to physical persons regardless of their
nationality and of course that of the victims.
The fifth example is that of Sierra Leone after civil war which devastated
this country as well as one of its neighbour States, Liberia. The “Special
Court for Sierra Leone” (SCSL)(215) was created thanks to an international
agreement(216) concluded in 2002 between Sierra Leone and the UN
represented by its Secretary-General.(217) The judiciary so established is
though an independent system outside the UN which aims at recovering a
(213) The lits of acts falling within the competence of this tribunal are much shorter
than, for instance, Article 7 ICC’s: murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation,
imprisonment, torture, rape, persecutions on political, racial, and religious grounds,
other inhumane acts.
(214) By inserting this crime among those falling within the jurisdiction of the tribunal,
it was – rightly – determined the international nature of the armed conflict.
(215) The headquarters of the SCSL are based in Freetown, except for the trial of
former president of Liberia, Charles Taylor, whose has been held at The Hague. He was
eventually convicted on April 2012 on 11 charges ranging from war crimes to CAH. It is
noteworthy to SCSL has been the first international criminal tribunal to sentence a
sitting head of State since IMT.
(216) The Statute of SCSL is annexed to the aforementioned agreement.
(217) Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on
the Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone signed on 16 January 2002.
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collapsed municipal judicial system whose last sentence went back to
1991…(218) The agreement provides for the establishment of a tribunal made
up of two levels: Trial and Appeals Chamber. In both of them sit foreign
(majority) and national judges who, according to the Statute of SCSL, are
bound to apply: a) PIL related to CAH (Article 2); b) violations of Common
Article 3 to the 4 1949 GE thus allowing the Tribunal to punish authors of
crimes of war (Article 1); c) “other serious violations of IHL” (Article 4); and
finally d) “Crimes under Sierra Leonean Law” (Article 5). Roughly speaking
and save the last item of applicable law, SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione materiae
is similar to that of the ICTR; this is unsurprising since in both cases there
had been a civil war, though with a further complication for the Sierra
Leonean case due to the implication of Liberia. SCSL’s jurisdiction ratione
loci is limited to one of the aforementioned crimes perpetrated over Sierra
Leonean territory regardless of the nationality of its victim and/or its author;
ratione temporis, only the dies a quo (i.e. the commencement of the
temporal jurisdiction) is defined (Article 1), while the setting of the dies ad
quem (i.e. the end) has been left to the assessment by the SCSL. Finally, the
latter’s jurisdiction ratione personae encompasses all “person(s) persons
who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international
humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed … including those
leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment
of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone” (Article 1
(1)).(219) In 2013 SCLS has completed its mandate and it has been
transformed into a residual mechanism, not dissimilar to that of ICTY and
ICTR.(220)
Lastly, what does the future hold for hybrid tribunals? Obviously, an
important element of the answer rests with the ultimate efficacy of these
(218) SCSL is the first international (or better hybrid) criminal tribunal to be funded by
voluntary contributions.
(219) The exceptions to this provision are members of the peace-keeping operations –
either under the umbrella of UN or any other regional organization – who remain
within “the primary jurisdiction of the sending State” (Article 1 (2)). However, if the
latter is unwilling or unable to prosecute its own national then SCSL may, “if authorized
by the Security Council on the proposal of any State, exercise jurisdiction over such
persons” (Article 1 (3)).
(220) The transition to the Residual Mechanism meant a hugely reduced staff – both
administrative and judicial (http://rscsl.org).
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tribunals in each specific case; another hint mas be also found in the ICC
itself and in its efficacy, too. If the ICC eventually meets the expectations of
the international community at large, States may well resort to it and,
conversely, have no more alibi not to do so.

III.2.3. ICC: a permanent international criminal jurisdiction:
a Long-nurtured dream made True
III.2.3.1. Introductory remarks
The idea of a permanent international criminal court dates back at least
to the Nineteenth century; for instance, one of the founding fathers of the
Red Cross, Gustave Moynier,(221) considered the establishment of such
tribunal as a natural, indeed necessary, institutional complement for the
implementation of the newly developed IHL and thus with a view to
punishing the authors of war crimes. Later on, a conspicuous number of
jurists wish to create a special chamber – entrusted to prosecute and trial
individual’s international crimes – within the future PCIJ, yet with no avail.
The situation did not change at all after WWII and the jurisdiction of the ICJ
– the successor of PCIJ – did not extend to international criminal
responsibility. Hence, the creation by the UNSC of the two ad hoc tribunals
renovated this old struggle for a permanent criminal justice by awaking the
(legal) conscience of States and international community alike, theretofore
in a state of torpor. The circumstances had never been in effect so
favourable to this renaissance: conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Rwanda,
Somalia, Pinochet and Barbie cases, etc. not to mention the end of the Cold
War and the need to revive an international order of which international
criminal justice is certainly a pillar.

(221) P. Boissier, Histoire du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge. De Solférino à
Tsoushima, Paris, 1963; C. K. Hall, “The first proposal for a permanent international
criminal court”, International Review of the Red Cross, vol. 322. For the Text of the
proposed 1872 draft by Gustave Moynier, see :
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jp4m.htm or Willem-Jan van
der Wolf, Claudia Tofan, Documentary history of the International Criminal Court. Part
I, International Courts Association, 2008 (at 1).
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On July 17, 1998 in Rome the diplomatic conference, convened by the
UN, gave birth to the ICC Statute.(222) It would have not taken much for this
attempt to be – again – unsuccessful, but thanks notably, to the enormous
pressure of the NGOs as well as of the international civil society at large that
this multilateral convention could finally see the day. The Rome Statute
represents in certain respects a triumph of the internationalists (i.e.
international jurists and diplomats alike) over (municipal) criminal law
jurists.
By making the ICC Statute, the international community establishes an
international judicial body, entrusted with the task of trying individuals
having committed international crimes. Contrariwise to the IMT (which
remained, as said before, a multinational tribunal) and in fact to the two ad
hoc tribunals, ICC is not created after a war by the victors to prosecute
criminal acts perpetrated by the vanquished. Furthermore, another
distinctive feature, ICC’s jurisdiction, again compared to the aforementioned
tribunals, is not circumstantial but potentially universal (it other words it
aims at covering the entire world).(223)
In effect, ICC’s jurisdiction encroaches to that of States; unlike the two ad
hoc international tribunals’ jurisdiction which principally infringed upon two
States (i.e. respectively former Yugoslavia, for the ICTY,(224) and Rwanda, for
the ICTR), ICC’s jurisdiction encroaches to all States parties to its Statute. As
one may intuitively imagine, this feature of the ICC was not warmheartedly
appreciated by all States,(225) especially, as it will be shown later on, by those

(222) An authoritative and widely acclaimed Commentary may be suggested for
further reading and enhanced knowledge: A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, The
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. A Commentary, Oxford, 2002.
(223) To-date, 123 States are parties to the ICC Statute (yet only the two European
Permanent Members of the UNSC are among them) whilst 139 have only signed it.
According to Article 126 (1) of the Statute 60 States’ ratifications or accessions were
needed for its entry into force; this happened the 1st of July 2002, i.e. one month after
the 60th State has deposited its instrument of ratification.
(224) To be more precise, one may include all States successors to former Yugoslavia,
hence six in all in all.
(225) For example, France fretted that its armed forces abroad – acting either under a
UNSC authorization under Chapter (VII) or within a peace-keeping operations – might
fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction (e.g. at the time of the making of ICC Statute France
had some forces in former Yugoslavia). Inversely, Ivory Coast, which was enthusiast
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States which are not parties to the Rome Statute. One shall not to forget
that the latter is an international treaty; it has hence to be interpreted
according to the customary international law principles codified in the 1969
VCLT. Criminal law jurists, who make nowadays the bulk of the bench of the
ICC, are not necessarily at ease with that and are not pleased either.
Furthermore, the recourse to ICC’s travaux préparatoires might well left the
jurist deeply unsatisfied since several questions remain in the dark; in fact,
the negotiations were not particularly long in time: the Conference lasted a
month only, while it took nearly 3 years to for the two ad hoc tribunals.
statutes to be drafted The brevity of the negotiations alongside with the
staunch resistance of some States – which took part at the Conference the
avowed goal to torpedo it or at least to water down the final outcome – may
explain why this text is the result of a manifold compromises which affects
in some respects its legal consistency. Numerous contradictions, alas,
punctuate it with the risk of weaken the overall structure; in addition, ICC
Statute was adopted not by consensus by qualified majority (two-thirds of
the present and voting States).(226)
III.2.3.2. ICC’s Jurisdiction
The different dimensions of the ICC’s jurisdiction stem from those of the
States parties; hence, the consolidated ICC’s jurisdiction isn’t but the sum of
these national jurisdictions, both personal and territorial. States parties have
thus devolved their jurisdictions to the ICC with regard to some international
crimes (the so-called “core-crimes”). In principle, all States enjoy under
general international law (i.e. “universal jurisdiction) a complete jurisdiction
to prosecute and try war crimes, CAH, genocide as well as crimes against
peace. Being thus members of the ICC involves the attribution of their
jurisdiction to the latter. Yet, ICC’s jurisdiction is not as large as of that of
States parties, insofar as it does not comprise the (passive) personal
jurisdiction, i.e. the power of the State of the victim’s nationality to
prosecute and try the authors of the crime regardless of his (or her)
nationality. Indeed, ICC’s personal jurisdiction (ratione personae)
encompasses solely the active ones, i.e. the nationality of the author of the
during the Rome conference, was much less when it was faced to a bloody and
devastating civil war.
(226) The score was 120 States voting for it, 7 against, and 21 abstaining.
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crime.(227) In other words, for the ICC to entertain a claim, the State of the
suspect’s nationality must be party to the ICC Statute. Alongside, with this
one-dimensional personal jurisdiction, ICC enjoys of course of the territorial
jurisdiction (ratione loci), i.e. it has jurisdiction if the crime has occurred on
the territory of one of the States parties to its Statute again independently
of the nationality of victim and that of the suspect.(228) In sum, for the Court
to have jurisdiction, only one of these two (hence alternatives) jurisdictional
criteria has to be met.(229) Hence, ICC may well prosecute and try a suspect
who is a national of a State which is not party to the ICC Statute provided
that the crime has been committed on the territory of a State that is party to
the ICC at the time of its perpetration. (230) This is in fact but what
international jurists call the territorial dimension of the application of an
(227) “The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that
vessel or aircraft” (Article 12 (2) a) ICC Statute).
(228) “The State of which the person accused is of the crime is a national”, (Article 12
(2) b) ICC Statute).
(229) During the negotiations, some States endeavoured to further limit ICC’s
jurisdiction. France, for instance, claimed that both criteria of jurisdiction – territorial
(locus commissi delicti) and personal (the nationality of the suspect) – had to be
reunited with a single State party for the ICC to try the suspect. Russian Federation
argued for a two-fold territorial jurisdiction: the locus commissi delicti and the place of
the suspect’s arrest had to be the same (i.e. in the same State territory) for the ICC to
enjoy jurisdiction over the international crime in point. Luckily enough these two
proposals were rebutted.
(230) This (sensitive) aspect of the ICC’s jurisdiction has irritated some States, among
which the USA which has hence manoeuvred to undermine it by concluding bilateral
treaties with more than one hundred States which are (or are bound to become)
parties to the ICC. The object and purpose of these almost identical international
bilateral agreements is precisely to obtain the commitment of these States not to
surrender US nationals to the ICC without the consent of the USA (e.g. Article 2 of the
bilateral
agreement
between
USA
and
Albania,
May
2,
2003;
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/library/research/guides/article_98.cfm). Indeed, per
Article 89 ICC Statute, States parties are under the obligation to surrender to the ICC a
suspect. True, as Article 98 (2) ICC Statute, “the Court may not proceed with a
request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently
with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the
Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for
the surrender”.
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international treaty (Article 29 VCLT). This is far from being surprising,
insofar if the ICC had not existed or if the State on whose territory the crime
was committed was not party to the ICC, then that State would have
normally enjoyed, by virtue of the principle of universal jurisdiction, the
power to try and prosecute the (alien) suspect.
Furthermore, ICC’s jurisdiction may be extended to cover a State’s both
personal and territorial jurisdiction, even though it is not member of the ICC
– if this State expresses its consent to this effect according to Article 12 (3).
Some scholars have criticized this provision on the ground that it would
allow States to recognize ICC’s jurisdiction à la carte, that it to say only when
it suits them.
Finally, ICC’s jurisdiction ratione personae is limited to physical persons
only (of 18 years old or older)(231) and does not extend to legal corporations
(contrariwise to the IMT).(232) Another important feature, inherited from the
IMT and the two ad hoc tribunals was the absolute lack of immunity which
could shield a suspect from trial and possibly a punishment. Article 27 ICC
reads indeed as following:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity as
a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction
of sentence.

(231) Article 26 ICC Statute. UK – alongside some African States – strived to lower this
threshold to 16 years, hence linking this age-limit with that of enrolment in their army.
(232) Draft ICC Statute envisaged the prosecution and trial of legal corporations; there
were indeed at least three main reasons underlying the need and usefulness of doing
so: a) physical persons rarely participate to the reparation of damages whilst legal
corporations are more often endowed of material resources in this respect; b) since
the criminal code of numerous States does not allow for their prosecution, ICC’s
jurisdiction would have filled this gap; c) this additional personal jurisdiction would
have had a general deterrence effect upon arms dealers and manufactures or those
corporations involved in the unlawful plundering of national resources during armed
conflicts, or in any other similar situations such as that of “Radio Mille Collines” in
Rwanda prompting Hutus to kill Tutsis thus triggering in fact the genocide.
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2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person. (233)
Ratione temporis, ICC’s jurisdiction applies since the entry into force of
the Rome Statute vis-à-vis the State party concerned. It then suffices that at
the moment of the commission of the crime, the State on whose territory it
has been committed or the State of the suspect’s nationality must be party
to the ICC Statute.(234)
Ratione materiae, ICC’s jurisdiction represents to date the most
successful attempt to codify customary international law(235) with regard to
the four core international crimes: genocide (Article 6), CAH (Article 7), war
crimes (Article 8), crime of aggression (Article 8bis).(236)A few words on each
must be spent in connection with what has already been said in this
regard.(237)
(233) Recently, the regrettable decisions of South Africa, Burundi and Gambia to
withdraw from the ICC Stature are ostensibly founded on the alleged (though
inexistent) incompatibility between Article 27 and the Law of State immunities. To so
pretend would be tantamount to revert to the legal framework before Nuremberg: it’s
unfortunate.
(234) Article 24 (1) ICC Statute. However, any State party to the ICC may temporarily
“opt-out” from the ICC’s jurisdiction: “Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2,
a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven
years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to
in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its
territory. A declaration under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions
of this article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with
article 123, paragraph 1”. This provision was inserted at the instigation of France.
(235) It goes without saying that States parties to the ICC have to insert these crimes in
their criminal codes lest they would give up prosecuting and trying them on the
municipal plane; failing to do so would make the States completely dependent – for
their prosecution and trials – from the ICC.
(236) The definition of this last international crime was inserted in 2010 by a resolution
adopted the Assembly of States parties convened in Kampala Uganda in accordance
with Article 5 (2) ICC Statute (resolution RC/Res.6 of 11 June 2010).
(237) It ought to be observed in this connection that the Court will ineluctably be faced
with some sensitive questions of criminal policy: standardization of charges since the
substantive criminal acts encompassed are not exactly the same as those provided for
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With respect to the crime of genocide that is placed at the first rank of
the international crimes over which ICC may wield its jurisdiction, there is
not too much to comment except that it is, unsurprisingly, the Xerox-copy of
the definition enshrined in the 1948 UN Genocide.(238) Regarding CAH, the
contribution of the ICC Statute is far more substantial. First of all, it dispels
some doubts insofar as it frees up the commission of a crime against
humanity from the existence of an armed conflict (be it international or noninternational), by borrowing instead from Article 3 ICTR Statute the formula
“committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against” (Article 7
(1) ICC Statute). Secondly, it appears now more neatly that States have
definitely rejected the need of a “special intention” (dolus specialis): what is
instead required is that the author of the crime had “knowledge of the
attack” (ibid.). Thirdly, Article 7 (2) finally compiles an exhaustive (or nearto) list of breaches encompassed by this category of international crimes.
This provision gives besides due attention to the details of these violations;
something international criminal jurists will be surely happy about. Yet, this
is not necessarily the case for the usual clause of Article 7 (1) k), a residual
clause, which provides that “other inhumane acts of a similar character
intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental
or physical health” may likewise be qualified – by the ICC – as CAH.
Regarding war crimes – in fact the oldest among the four core
international crimes- Article 8 ICC constitutes the culmination of a lengthy
development. Its structure is double two-fold, subdivided firstly having
regard to the international – or not –(239) character of the conflict, and then
having regard to the object of the breach. With respect to the IAC, it
encompasses the famous “grave breaches” of the four GE 1949 as well as
“other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international
armed conflict” (Article 8 (2) b)). This same skeleton is replicated with regard
to NIAC, to the extent that war crimes in this connection comprises any
violation to common Article 3 of the four GE 1949 as well as “other serious
by municipal systems (as well as, sometimes, by international conventions). The same
applies all the more with regard to penalties.
(238) A not too strong attempt to include therein genocide against social and political
groups was outright rejected in Rome.
(239) The question whether a war crime can be committed during a NIAC is henceforth
clearly settled since ICTY Appeals Chamber’s judgement in the Tadic case (1995), see
supra II.1.4.
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violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character” (Article 8 (2) e)). In both types of armed conflict
(IAC(240) and NIAC(241)) the use of “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases” is
a war crime.(242)
Finally, regarding the “crime of aggression”, which was considered by
IMT’s jurisprudence as “the crime of crimes”, it was inserted into the ICC’s
Statute after its adoption (in fact, as it has been said earlier, even after its
entry into force). The reasons underlying the postponement of the
introduction of this category of international crimes within the compass of
the ICC’s jurisdiction rest not so much on substantive grounds but rather on
institutional ones, that is to say the relations with the UNSC powers under
Chapter VII UNC. Article 8bis eventually included in 2010 manages to
reconcile the respective powers of a UN organ, entrusted with the principal
responsibility to maintain and restore international peace and security. And
of an international judicial body which does not pertain to the UN system.
Indeed, some legitimate concerns were voiced by the UNSC with respect to
its powers of defining an act of aggression faced in the context of, for
instance, a (parallel) judicial finding by the ICC having determined its
existence or inversely its inexistence. These questions – of which more later
on – are notably settled in Articles 13, 16 and 18. From the standpoint of
substantive law, as earlier said, Article 8 bis reproduces verbatim, by
through an explicit reference, Article 3 of the UNGA resolution 3314 that is
largely considered as being the faithful reflection of customary international
law regarding (the crime of) aggression.(243)
The substantive law as enunciated by Articles 6 to 8 bis for each of the
four core international crimes is not, by all means, forever frozen – PIL
evolves as any other legal system – as Article 10 takes care to specify and
warn:

(240) Article 8 (2) b) xviii)
(241) Article 8 (2) e) xiv)
(242) Instead, this provision is unsurprisingly less bold – on the grounds of the
uncertainty reigning in this regard - with respect of the use of nuclear weapons in an
armed conflict. This is also mirrored by the World Court’s advisory opinion in 1996.
(243) See supra II.1.3.
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“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in
any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute”
Hence, State parties to the ICC may not only amend the ICC Statute –
that’s one of the functions of the Assembly of States parties (and it has
already acted this way in respect of the crime of aggression) – but they may
also conclude treaties or develop customary international law (through their
opinio iuris) leading thus to a modification of current general international
law in respect of the definition of (or adjunction of new) international
crimes.

III.2.3.3. ICC’s Modus operandi
III.2.3.3.1.

Criminal proceedings

Some States insisted during the Rome conference that any criminal penal
action by the ICC should be authorized by the UNSC. This subordination of
the ICC’s investigative and prosecution actions to the UNSC would have
paralyzed the Court and was wisely rejected.(244) Hence, the Prosecutor –
one of the ICC’s organs – may “initiate an investigation” (Article 13) whilst
the Court (Pre-Trial Chamber) is vested with the power of authorizing or not
its commencement. This solution guarantees on one side the necessary
independence of the judicial power from the UNSC (i.e. sort of Executive
power) while on the other side checking over the Prosecutor’s action
preventing it to be politically motivated or abused.(245)
By virtue of Article 13 (a) States may also refer a “situation” to the
Prosecutor “for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific
persons should be charged with the commission of such crimes” (Article 14
(1)). In the same vein, UNSC may too refer a situation as provided by Article
(244) It ought to be nonetheless observed that in some countries the executive power
may defer or even stop an investigation.
(245) In the same vein, it ought to be noted that the Prosecutor may “upon
investigation” concludes that the prosecution does not serve the “interests of justice”
(Article 53 ICC Statute). This may also be construed as an attempt to reconcile, for
instance, the imperatives of international criminal justice with those stemming from a
wider need of a transitional justice. UNSC’s power of deferral may also be looked
through this prism, see infra III.2.3.3.1.
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13 (b). In brief, according to Article 13, the Court may exercise jurisdiction in
any situation referred to by a State (a),(246) by the UNSC (b)(247) through the
investigation of the Prosecutor (c).(248)
Given the highly sensitive aspects of the crime of aggression, a more
complex procedure aimed at reconciling States’, UNSC’s and ICC’s powers in
this regard is established. Article 15 bis and ter indeed provide respectively
for the procedures to be followed in the case of a referral by a State and by
the UNSC of a situation characterized by an act of aggression.
Finally, it seems that ICC Statute takes in due consideration the
competences and powers of the UNSC under Chapter VII, thus endeavouring
to fit the action of the ICC into the wider scope of the maintenance of
international peace and security. In effect, UNSC may, under the Rome
Statute refer a situation to the Court (Article 13 (b) & 15 ter),(249) even
though none of the two alternative jurisdictional criteria is met, availing
itself of its powers under Chapter VII(250) thatare thus unaffected by the
ICC.(251) Conversely, UNSC may block the prosecution or investigation
initiated by the Prosecutor for one year (renewable) by adopting a
resolution to this aim under Chapter VII:
“No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of
(246) These States are hitherto exclusively African: Ivory Coast, Central African
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda.
(247) UNSC has already availed itself of this power and has heretofore referred two
situations to the ICC: Libya, (Darfur) Sudan (resolution 1593 (31 March 2005) “to refer
the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002 to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court” (para. 1).
(248) Under the terms of Article 15 (1), in fact, “The Prosecutor may initiate
investigations proprio motu on the basis of information on crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court”.
(249) In so doing the Court will act pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction.
(250) This seems absolutely consistent with the UNSC powers in this field, for if it can
create ex novo an ad hoc tribunal it may all the more refer a situation to a pre-existing
international judicial criminal body.
(251) Furthermore, by virtue of Article 103 UNC, obligations under the UNC “shall
prevail” over any other international obligations, save of course obligations stemming
from ius cogens rules.
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the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that
request may be renewed by the Council under the same
conditions”(252)
The UNSC power to defer investigation or prosecution – recognized by
Article 16 ICC – stems from its “principal responsibility” for the maintenance
of international peace and security. The interest of this provision lay with
the limitation of the role of the P5 which otherwise might have put their
veto to the seisin of the Court. However, this power to defer the exercise of
jurisdiction (investigation or prosecution) by the Court must not be
overstated since it needs not only the “concurring” (yes, abstention or
“vacant seat”) of the P5 but also at least four non-permanent UNSC
members for the resolution to be adopted according to Article 27 UNC. (253)
To-date only one case may be cited as an example of application of this oftcriticized provision, by which UNSC eventually bestowed a general immunity
from the ICC’s jurisdiction all “operations established peace-keeping forces
or authorized peace-enforcing forces by the United Nations Security
Council … deployed to maintain or restore international peace and
security”.(254) Furthermore, this is all the more true shall the UNSC intend to
extend for another year-term this deferral.

III.2.3.3.2. ICC vis-à-vis States’ concurrent
Jurisdictions
(252) Article 16 ICC Statute.
(253) With regard to the “actual” construction of this major provision relating to voting
procedures within the UNSC, see: G. Distefano, 2019, pp. 249-250.
(254) Paragraph 2 of the Preamble of UNSC resolution 1422 (12 July 2002); by OP 1 it is
“requested” to the ICC, “consistent with the provisions of Article 16 of the Rome
Statute, that the ICC, if a case arises involving current or former officials or personnel
from a contributing State not a Party to the Rome Statute over acts or omissions
relating to a United Nations established or authorized operation, shall for a twelvemonth period starting 1 July 2002 not commence or proceed with investigation or
prosecution of any such case, unless the Security Council decides otherwise;”. This
general deferral of jurisdiction has already been renewed once. See UNSC Resolution
395 (25 August 1976) ; and GA Resolution 1142 (XII) and 1361 (XIV), see also Giovanni
Distefano and Etienne Henry, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Security
Council: disentangling Themis from Ares’, in: Karine Bannelier, Theodore Christakis and
Sarah Heathcote (ed.), The ICJ and the Evolution of International Law, Routledge, 2012,
§ 5.3 (at 67).
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While the two ad hoc international tribunals – ICTY and ICTR – enjoy a
primacy over municipal courts in prosecuting and trying those persons
accused of international crimes falling within their jurisdiction, member
States of the ICC retain their whole jurisdiction in this respect and are under
“the duty to exercise their criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for
international crimes”.(255) Hence, in the terms of jurisdiction, the relations
between ICC and its Members may be qualified of “subsidiarity” in lieu of
primacy to the extent that if the latter initiate an investigation, it has the
right to oppose that the Court try the suspect (even though if this same
State concludes that there is no reason to bring a prosecution). This won’t
apply, nonetheless, if the Court determines this State’s bad faith(256) or
alternatively its incapacity (“non possumus”) or unwillingness (“non
volumus”) to try the suspect (Article 17 ICC Statute). This provision –
enabling States to refer a situation to the ICC – undoubtedly represents the
backbone of the functioning of the Court with respect to the concurrent
jurisdictions of Member States. It may be assumed that this clause was
particularly appreciated and backed by many developing countries that
considered themselves unable (“non possumus”)(257) or preferred, for other
reasons such as political or social sensitiveness (“non volumus”), not to
prosecute and try international crimes encompassed by the jurisdiction of
the ICC. It falls then to the Court to assess the fulfilment of either two
situations; in so doing the Court will hence intervene concretely within the
municipal framework of the national prosecution with a view to assessing
(255) Sixth preambular part of the ICC Statute.
(256) Furthermore, according to the principle general of law “ne bis in idem”, the
Court may not try a second time a person “with respect to the same conduct unless
the proceedings in the other court” have been carried out “ a) with the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court; or b) were not conducted independently or impartially in
accordance with the norms of due process recognized by international law and were
conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to
bring the person concerned to justice” (Article 20 (3) a), b)).
(257) Among the reasons why a State would be unable to prosecute and try a person
suspect of having committed an international crime may lay with the immunity the
accused would enjoy according to domestic law, for example a Head of State, such it
has been the case for the President of the Republic of Kenya, accused of CAH and who
appeared before the ICC on 2014. The Prosecutor eventually withdrew the charges
against him on December 4, 2014.
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the real intention of the State in point to prosecute a given international
crime. The Court will thus make a finding on a national system’s willingness
or capacity to prosecute and try international crimes.(258)
Moreover, ICC Statute (Article 17 (1) d))(259) pointedly states that the
Court has jurisdiction over case of “sufficient gravity”, such as for example
CAH, “large-scale commission” of war crimes (Article 8 (1)). Hence, the
principal aim of the ICC Statute is not that of prosecuting and trying any
international crime, but to allow States to refer to the ICC the gravest
crimes(260) while at the same time (for any international crime encompassed
by the ICC Statute) enabling the Court to verify whether States duly abide by
their obligations under the Rome Statute and general international law. In
this respect, the ICC is expected to play the rôle of “watch-dog” towards
Member States. This provision would then surely encourage (push?) the
latter to carry out their judicial function on the municipal plane.
III.2.3.3.3. Member States as “control agents” and
“executive agents” of the ICC
The effective operation of the ICC depends to a large extent from the
goodwill of its Member States. They are indeed at the same its “control
agents” and its “executive agents”. With regard to the former, Member
States are meant to control – through the Assembly of States Parties – ICC’s
activity (Article 112 ICC Statute); in this context they may be led to confer
more resources and means of action to the ICC (Article 121 ICC Statute).
With regard to the second aspect, i.e. “executive agents”, the seat of the ICC
being at The Hague, States are expected to provide appropriate places of
detention and imprisonment. Further, since the Court’s funding falls
inevitably on Member States’ shoulders, this might fuel a perverted relation

(258) In this connection, the Court will be led, it is too early to make an assessment
today, to incidentally develop a jurisprudence on the construction of the concept of
“due process of law” as envisaged by Article 17 (2). This concept is in fact instrumental
to trigger its subsidiary jurisdiction with regard to the State’s.
(259) In addition, 4th PP of the ICC Statute refers to the “most serious crimes of
concern to the international community”.
(260) Contrariwise to the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals which, at least
initially, were endowed with the mandate of prosecuting and trying any international
crimes within their jurisdiction.
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with some of the Member States at some point with the risk of affecting the
Court’s activity. In this connection, one does not have to forget that ICC
does not have judicial police; hence it will rely on States’ goodwill to collect
evidence, arrest suspects, search and bring witnesses, etc. True, by virtue of
the pre-eminence of the Court over the requested State, hence unlike to the
classical system of international judicial cooperation between States,
requested States are under the obligation to carry out the request made by
the Court. If they do not – and it is for the Court to make such a finding –
then ICC may refer the problem for further action either to the Assembly of
States Parties or to the UNSC, if the situation in point has been referred by it
to the Court under Article 13 (b) ICC Statute. However, in both cases the
latter instrument does not provide for any specific sanction.(261) Moreover, if
the requested cooperation affects State’s “national security” (Article 72 ICC
Statute), then the procedure becomes far more heavy and complicated with
the risk of a substantial loss of time for the Court.(262)

(261) Of course, UNSC may avail of its general powers under Chapter VII in order to
make the recalcitrant State to comply with the ICC Statute and Court’s order.
(262) This argument is likely to be raised notably in connection with the commission of
war crimes “where the disclosure of the information or documents of a State would, in
the opinion of that State, prejudice its national security interest” (Article 72 (1) ICC
Statute).
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املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية للفرد :قفزة نوعية إلنسانية اإلنسان
أ.د .جيوفاين ديستيفانو :
حصل عىل درجة الدكتوراه يف العالقات الدولية ختصص القانون الدويل من املعهد العايل للدراسات الدولية يف جنيف.
زائرا يف أكاديمية القانون الدويل اإلنساين
منذ فرباير  2009يعمل أستاذ ًا يف كلية احلقوق بجامعة نيوشاتيل .كام كان أستا ًذا ً
وحقوق اإلنسان (جنيف) .عمل جيوفاين ديستيفانو ساب ًقا يف التدريس يف جامعات جنيف ولوزان وكاتانيا (إيطاليا) والعني

(اإلمارات العربية املتحدة) ومعهد ( IHEIباريس) .مشاريعه احلالية هي "القانون الدويل للمساحات" واستخدام القوة يف

العالقات الدولية.

امللخص باللغة العربية:
باملعنى الصحيح ،فإن املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية ليست فص ً
ال جديدً ا من القانون الدويل
مؤخرا لفصل قديم من قانون األمم .يف املايض القريب ،شهدنا
العام ،بل هي إعادة إحياء
ً
ظهور حماكم جنائية دولية خمصصة ،ذات اختصاص حمدود ،عىل النحو املنصوص عليه يف
أنظمتها األساسية( .)263وبدالً من ذلك ،تتمتع املحكمة اجلنائية الدولية اليوم ،ضمن

حدودها القانونية (املعاهدة) ،بوالية قضائية عامة؛ وبالتايل فهي جهاز دائم ذو طابع عام،
يعكس حمكمة العدل الدولية يف مسائل القانون اجلنائي الدويل .كام سيكون مسؤوالً عن
املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية لألفراد.
عىل النقيض من النهجني السابقني ،بنا ًء عىل "احلق" ،سنتعامل هنا مع "االلتزامات"
التي مُتنح للفرد ،أي االلتزامات الدولية بعدم ارتكاب بعض األفعال التي توصف بأهنا
جريمة (يوريس جنتيوم) قانون األمم .يتعامل قانون العزل السيايس مع األفراد من خالل
حظر ارتكاب مثل هذه اجلرائم .لذلك يتم تفسري الفرد عىل أنه الذات السلبية يف العالقات
القانونية الدولية؛ جيب عليه أن حياسب  -أمام املحاكم البلدية والدولية عىل حد سواء -
عن أفعاله السيئة (انتهاك االلتزامات الدولية) املرتكبة ضد الدول وكذلك األفراد
اآلخرين)264(.

وبالتايل ،إذا كانت املسؤولية ،من زاوية احلامية الدولية حلقوق اإلنسان،

( )263عىل سبيل املثال ،يوغوسالفيا السابقة ورواندا
( )264وجتدر اإلشارة إىل أن املسؤولية اجلنائية الدولية للفرد ال يتم تكبدها يف الواقع جتاه األشخاص الذين عانوا (أو
تأثروا) بالفعل بارتكاب جريمته .هنا نجد مرة أخرى ،ولكن مع األدوار املقلوبة ،نفس املعادلة يف املنظورين السابقني ،أي
الدولة أو املجتمع الدويل (الطرف املترضر) والفرد (الطرف املتخلف).
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تنطوي عىل شخصية نشطة ،يف هذه احلالة ،تمعترب الشخصية سلبية.
برصف النظر عن "اجلرائم" الدولية للدول التي ال يزال وجودها بحاجة إىل النظر
بعناية ،فإن القانون الدويل يفكر يف وجود فئات معينة من اجلرائم التي يرتكبها أفراد
يترصفون إما بشكل فردي أو كأجهزة تابعة للدولة( .)265ومع ذلك ،فإن عد ًدا قلي ً
ال فقط
من هذه االنتهاكات عرضة للمقاضاة واملعاقبة عىل املستوى الدويل ،بينام ال تتم مقاضاة
ومعاقبة اآلخرين إال من قبل السلطات القضائية الوطنية.
تمظهر التطورات الثورية التي ختللت مقاطعة قانون العزل السيايس منذ النصف الثاين
من القرن العرشين فصاعدً ا ،والتي تدخلت بشدة يف أحد العنارص األساسية للمجال
أيضا اعتبار الفرد موضو ًعا دول ًيا .يف هذا
املحجوز للدولة (للقمع اإلجرامي) أنه جيب ً
املجال ،رشيطة أن تتم مقاضاته وحماكمته مبارشة من قبل آلية قضائية دولية.
يف الواقع ،عىل مستوى العقوبة الدولية عىل هذه اجلرائم نشأ الفرد يف القانون الدويل
أخريا ،من املهم
كحامل لاللتزامات الدولية ،وبالتايل كموضوع للقانون الدويل(.)266
ً
مالحظة أن املسؤولية اجلنائية للفرد ال تؤثر ،بأي شكل من األشكال ،عىل املسؤولية
الدولية املصاحبة للدولة يف هناية املطاف ،بل عىل العكس من ذلك ،فإن "ازدواجية
املسؤولية هذه تظل سمة ثابتة من سامت القانون الدويل"( .)267والواقع أنه إذا كان من
ٍ
عندئذ حتميل الدولة
املمكن أن مينسب سلوكها إىل دولة بطريقة أو بأخرى( ،)268فيمكن
( )265انظر:
G. Distefano ،Fundamentals of Public International Law .

رسم ختطيطي للنظام القانوين الدويل ،ليدن 2019 ،ص .702-700
( )266انظر:
؛ G. Balladore Pallieri ،1962 ،pp.21-222
س .رومانو ،1933 ،ص 77-76؛ كوادري ،1968 ،ص ( 408-407منذ أن تم الوفاء بالرشط الذي قدمه هذا الفقهي الشهري  -أي
وجود هيئات دولية تتمتع بسلطة قمع هذه اجلرائم الدولية عىل املستوى الدويل)؛ كاسيزي  ، 2001 ،ص  81-79؛
؛)A. Verdross ،B. Simma ،1984 ،§§ 430-443 (pp.260-267
( )267تطبيق اتفاقية منع جريمة اإلبادة اجلامعية واملعاقبة عليها( 173 § ،2007 ،يف  .)116انظر املادة  25الفقرة  4من النظام
األسايس للمحكمة اجلنائية الدولية وكذلك املادة  ، IR 2001 58التي تنص عىل ما ييل" :ال ختل هذه املواد بأي مسألة تتعلق باملسؤولية
الفردية بموجب القانون الدويل ألي شخص يترصف نيابة عن دولة".
( )268انظر :
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املسؤولية الدولية .من اآلن فصاعدً ا ،ستكون هناك مسؤوليتان دوليتان (الفرد والدولة) يف
إطار النظام القانوين الدويل يمكن أن تؤدي إىل أنواع خمتلفة من القمع وأشكال
العقوبات)269(.

: G: Distefano ،2019 ،pp.653-695.
( ")269تتحمل الدولة ومن يترصفون باسمها املسؤولية اجلنائية عن انتهاكات القانون الدويل بسبب خطورهتا  ،وخطورهتا  ،وازدراءهم
للحياة البرشية  ،وتضعهم يف فئة األفعال اإلجرامية كام يفهمها القانون عمو ًما الدول املتحرضة " ،قانون أوبنهايم الدويل  ،الطبعة الثامنة.

(السري هريش لوترباخت) ،ص.355 .
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